


10 May 1993



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JPRS Report



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Official Media on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing
*OW040505193 Beijing XINHUA in English 0417 GMT
4 May 93*

[Text] Washington, May 3 (XINHUA)—A senior Pentagon official has called for the resumption of nuclear weapons testing "at the earliest time" under the provisions of law.

Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee's nuclear energy panel, Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch, who is in charge of acquisition and heads the Nuclear Weapons Council, said the resumption was essential for the U.S. to "maintain a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent after the testing is halted."

Washington has to decide whether to resume nuclear weapons testing before a June 1 deadline, after a 9-month moratorium imposed last September.

The U.S. has called for a total ban of nuclear weapons tests from October 1, 1996.

The total ban, however, could be waived if the Russians resume testing after that date.

Laboratories in the United States, hoping to save thousands of jobs involved in testing programs, have been lobbying for the resumption from September.

Deutch said without nuclear testing, scientists and engineers can only base their judgement "on theory, calculations, adaptations of archival test data, and data available from non-nuclear tests."

"Only nuclear tests can provide data on the nuclear aspects of the integrated weapon system performance," Deutch said.

The U.S. Department of Energy has allocated 462 million U.S. dollars for fiscal 1994 for four nuclear weapons tests.

The House Armed Services Committee will begin deliberations on the allocation on May 20.

[For further information on Beijing's stance on nuclear weapons testing, see 'Beijing Cites U.S. Practice in Defending Nuclear Test' in the 24 June 1992 edition of Trends, pages 17-19, or call the Arms Control Report editor on (703) 733-6454 to order a copy.]

China Seen as Pivotal Player in North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Seoul Fears Chinese Opposition in UN
*SK3004011893 Seoul YONHAP in English 0054 GMT
30 Apr 93*

[Text] United Nations, April 29 (YONHAP)—The permanent members of the U.N. Security Council [UNSC] have finished drafting a resolution on North Korea but are engaged in last-minute negotiations because China opposes it, officials at the South Korean mission said Thursday.

The five-point draft has been circulated among the 15 permanent and non-permanent council members, who are expected to vote on it in a formal meeting sometime next week, the officials said.

The centerpiece of the draft is the security council's indirect warning of economic sanctions, which says the members will decide on further measures if North Korea does not take steps to resolve concern over its secretive nuclear program.

It urges North Korea to rescind its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), confirm its responsibilities as an NPT party and comply with the safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The draft calls on IAEA Director-general Hans Blix to negotiate with North Korea to solve Pyongyang's non-compliance and to report the results of the negotiation to the Security Council within one month after the resolution is adopted. It asks all U.N. members to persuade North Korea.

While the statement issued by the UNSC president earlier this month expressed overall concern of the international community, the resolution makes specific demands and makes room for further coordinated actions, including an economic embargo, the officials pointed out.

U.N. sources said there was a considerable chance of a much softer resolution because of persistent opposition from China, which is a permanent member and has veto power.

"The time has come for China to clarify where it stands on North Korea's nuclear program," one South Korean diplomat said, cautiously optimistic that Beijing is more likely to abstain than veto because of the global dimension of the problem.

An abstention would mean China was conditionally voting "yes" on the resolution, adding a new level of pressure on North Korea to comply with the international demands, officials said.

Foreign Minister Qian to Seoul to Discuss Issue
*SK0305022893 Seoul YONHAP in English 0219 GMT
3 May 93*

[Text] Seoul, May 3 (YONHAP)—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen is expected in Seoul around May 25 for talks strategically timed to coincide with the middle of final efforts to bring North Korea back to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), officials said Monday.

Qian is to come for a three-night visit and meet with Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu.

Unless North Korea clearly indicated before his visit that it would return to the NPT and submit to international nuclear inspections, the two countries would seek joint steps to counter Pyongyang's secretive nuclear program and discuss the U.N. Security Council's second resolution on North Korea, due around then, the officials said.

Pyongyang announced it was leaving the NPT in March. The withdrawal becomes final on June 12, unless North Korea rescinds it.

Seoul invited Qian in January to visit between late May and early June, and the officials cautiously attach significance to the fact that the Chinese foreign minister chose to come in late May.

According to a sketchy timetable, the U.N. Security Council is likely to adopt a resolution as early as this week demanding North Korea rejoin the NPT and comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands to inspect two suspected facilities.

The United States is expected to hold a direct high-level contact with North Korea after the resolution is passed to break the deadlock.

Seoul officials say the security council will move for a second resolution in early June that may contain an economic embargo on North Korea.

Qian will be the first Chinese official to pay respects at the South Korean national cemetery, where South Korean soldiers killed during the Korean war are buried. China fought on North Korea's side during the 1950-1953 fratricidal war.

Speculation on Stance in UNSC

*SK0505012893 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
5 May 93 p 1*

[Article by reporter Pak Tu-sik]

[Text] It has been learned on 4 May that China officially objected to the UN Security Council's first resolution against North Korea as it now stands.

On 4 May, according to a Seoul-based diplomatic source, China, which can exercise its veto on various agenda items as one of the five permanent UN Security Council members, told Western permanent UN Security Council members: It is not proper to accept a resolution at the United Nations at present. China proposed to the Western permanent UN Security Council members that a neutral statement of the UN Security Council's chairman should be accepted.

China, however, has changed its stance on objecting to discussion on North Korea's nuclear issue among UN Security Council permanent members. China will participate in unofficially discussing the nuclear issue beginning this week. Our attention, therefore, is focused on the result of the nuclear issue negotiations.

The other permanent UN Security Council members—the United States, England, France, and Russia—and Western countries delivered to the Chinese side the draft of the resolution against North Korea on 23 April. It has been learned that they are holding unofficial negotiations to see whether the Chinese stance may lead to the exercise of its veto right.

Assuming that "China may agree with other Western countries on taking a UN measure to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue," the Seoul-based source added that "a brisk behind-the-scenes contact is under way with the Chinese side."

The source noted: Western countries, including the ROK and the United States, hope to accept resolutions twice by 12 June—the time when North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty goes into effect. The source added: The Western side thinks that a grave stumbling block has been created in implementing the plan.

In the likelihood that the resolution against North Korea would be accepted through the Chinese side's "abstention" or "silent assent" at the UN Security Council on around 7 May, the ROK Government had planned to send Sin Ki-pok, first assistant secretary of the Foreign Ministry, to New York on 4 May. The ROK Government, however, postponed sending Assistant Secretary Sin to New York. The source revealed that the ROK Government had also planned to send Assistant Secretary Sin to Washington to negotiate resuming the North-South dialogue with the U.S. Government.

Article Says Arms Race Occurring Despite Disarmament

HK0305024293 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 15, 12 Apr 93 p 24

[“International Commentary” by Li Nan [2621 2809]: “Arms Race Begins Again While Disarmament Is Being Discussed”]

[Text] With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the tension between East and West has eased off and the United States and Russia have agreed to cut another batch of nuclear weapons. The formerly confronting sides have claimed that they would cut down military expenditure and reduce the size of troops, giving the impression that the boisterous arms race has all of a sudden decelerated and the world seems to have taken a turn from the path beset with difficulties that has long been troublesome.

Is it really so? Let us not relax and feel relieved too quickly, as we may not be able to afford optimism about everything. A short while ago, the biggest ever world weaponry exposition was held in Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates, and many new varieties of arms have come on stage to attract buyers. This time, France took the first place and carried off an astounding amount of orders. Though the United States and Britain were slightly behind France, they had earlier each sold much more new firearms to the Gulf region than France.

These facts indicate that while the overstocked old stuff is being destroyed on the one hand, some more advanced new weapons are being developed and many of them have come into the market. Those sold to the Gulf region in the Middle East include tanks with state-of-the-art electronic technology, rockets with improved radar guidance, high-efficiency cannons and planes, and so on. These new gadgets were so appealing that many buyers were dazzled and lost no time in buying them. The Middle East, as pointed out by some reports in foreign media, is becoming an arsenal of advanced weapons. However, the arms race is not happening in the Middle East only: Russia has vowed to regain its lost arms market.

Previous experience indicates that whatever is sold on the market is not the seller's best stuff, as the best is not for display. Thus, the arms race is actually still going on, not in quantity, but in quality, the end to the cold war between the East and West has only temporarily diverted people's attention.

There are many known new military projects being developed in Western countries. More systemized and precise, these weapons are the next generation of war equipment for the new century.

While the development of conventional weapons is so intense, what is happening to nuclear weapons, which are most worrying? The United States and Russia have agreed to cut a batch of theirs. This gesture is welcomed by many countries. Anyway, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries are too big and some of the weapons will become outdated as the time goes by. Just as it was not cheap to produce nuclear weapons, destroying them has now also become a problem. Russia asked the United States for some financial help, but the latter was reluctant. For the United States to destroy its weapons as agreed, the expense also has to be covered by taxpayers' money. Earlier, the United States sent a batch of chemical weapons to an island in the Pacific for destruction. With all the money and manpower spent, it provoked protest from the residents in nearby places. It would run into greater opposition and would be absolutely impossible if a destruction site were to be set up on its own territory. Destroying these weapons, which were once advanced but are now outdated, is causing a real headache to the owners. It was hard enough to beg the advent of a god [qing shen 6153 4377], but sending him away is not easy either.

In that case, have they given up begging the advent of the god of nuclear war? No, they have not. The development of more advanced nuclear weapons has not been discontinued. As a secret, this matter is rarely exposed. Nevertheless, a report in a national quality paper of the United States has revealed something about it.

This report quoted an official of the competent department in the United States as saying: Consideration is being given to the development of a type of chemical warhead that can surely destroy attacking missiles or a type of nuclear warhead that has a very low level of energy, a type of nuclear warhead that penetrates the ground and hits the target deep underground, a type of airborne precision, low-energy nuclear warhead, and a type of hypervelocity airborne nuclear warhead that can penetrate any possible defense line encountered.

This report also mentioned: The United States is continuing to research tactical and strategic radio frequency weapons which may produce maximum electromagnetic pulses to damage the enemy's electronic equipment and communication.

In this world, the development of things is so complicated, ungraspable, and evasive. While the tune of disarmament is still playing, the scheme of arms race has restarted. This, alas, is life.

Today, over 30 wars and conflicts are going on in the world. Regional and partial as they are, they, when put together, cost thousands of lives every day and eat up large quantities of military supplies. War needs weapons and munitions to keep war going. This is how they promote each other.

The factors causing the arms race are so complicated that it is hard to trace the origin and find the root. In the final analysis, an important factor among everything is that the attempt to maintain hegemonic status and superiority in the international arena has not vanished. Though maintaining superiority depends on the overall political and economic strength, it is also supported by outstanding military equipment. The world is still turbulent and the arms race is in the ascendant.

However, maintaining peace and seeking development in peace is after all the wish of the entire human society. The people want to live on in a panic-free state. The call and struggle for peace and against arms race will not stop.

Chinese Scientists on 'Arms Control Physics' **93FE0475A**

[Editorial report on article by Du Xiangwan [2629 4382 3834] and Li Bin [2621 1755] of Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, Beijing 100008; Song Jiashu [1345 1367 2885] of the Chinese Nuclear Materials Society, Beijing 100082; and Zhu Guangya [2612 0342 0068] of the Chinese Society of Science and Technology, Beijing 100081: "Physics Issues in Arms Control"]

[Editorial report] The Chinese-language journal WULI [PHYSICS] in its Vol 21 No 11 November 1992 edition on pages 654-659 carried an article entitled "Physics Issues in Arms Control" that asserts that a new branch of science called 'arms control physics' is evolving. The authors posit that international arms control treaties and negotiations have led to an 'implementation phase' that raises scientific questions. Specifically, the authors believe that the scope of this new scientific field encompasses 'various physical and technological problems associated with arms control, such as weapons capability and war effect, systems analysis of arms control, verification techniques, and weapons production and destruction techniques.'

The article details explanations of several subdivisions of the science of arms control including: weapons capability, systems analysis, verification techniques, and arms destruction technology.

For the full text of this article, see JPRS-CST-93-008, JPRS Science and Technology Report, China series, 28 April 1993, pages 1-6 or call the Arms Control Report editor on (703) 733-6454.

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

Japanese Air Base Hosts U.S. 'Space Defense Forces'

*LD0405130093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1147 GMT 4 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo May 4 TASS—U.S. space defence forces have deployed a special-purpose electronic reconnaissance unit to track satellites at the Misawa air base in Aomori Prefecture (Honshu Island), Japan's most northern American military facility. This was confirmed at a request of the ITAR-TASS correspondent by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Backman, officer on duty at the base.

His official reply in writing can be virtually regarded as an indirect confirmation that the activities of the new unit, according to Japanese data, are directed primarily against Russian satellites and include the interception and study of telemetric communications signals transmitted by them.

The document has it that the principal mission of the unit from among the 3rd Surveillance Squadron (the 73rd Group of the Military Space Command of the U.S. Air Force with headquarters at Falcon air base in Colorado) is to detect, track, identify and systematise all manmade space objects in low-earth orbits.

Tokyo Plans International Oversight Committee on Weapons Dismantling

*OW3004121093 Tokyo KYODO in English 1137 GMT
30 Apr 93*

[Text] Tokyo, April 30 KYODO—Japan has drafted a plan to set up an international committee to study measures for disposing of plutonium generated from the dismantling of nuclear weapons in Russia, government officials said Friday [30 April].

According to the draft plan, the committee will be comprised of three subcommittees that will study disposal methods and the storage of the highly toxic substance that is produced from the dismantling of the weapons.

The committee will also develop measures to use the plutonium for peaceful purposes, the officials said.

After the plan is given final approval by government ministries and agencies concerned, Japan will urge Russia, the United States and European countries to take part in the projects, the officials said.

The committee will study proposals over the next 5 years and Japan will cover all expenses, which are estimated to cost more than 10 billion yen, as part of the nation's economic assistance to Russia, the officials said.

As for peaceful uses for plutonium, the committee will study a proposal that calls for mixing the substance with uranium to be utilized in nuclear power plants in Russia.

A plan to construct nuclear facilities in Russia for the exclusive use of plutonium will also be studied by the committee.

The volume of plutonium expected to be produced in the dismantling of Russian nuclear weapons, which is in line with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II signed by Russia and the U.S., will amount to some 100 tons.

The issue of plutonium disposal was raised by foreign and finance ministers from the Group of Seven (G-7) countries when they met in Tokyo in mid-April to discuss aid for Russia.

The G-7 leaders agreed that disposal of plutonium in Russia will have a great impact on global security, the officials said.

NORTH KOREA

Daily Denounces U.S. for Applying 'Double Standard' to Nuclear Issue

*SK0405111693 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1029 GMT 4 May 93*

[“Double Standard Is Tool of Imperialists for Domination and Intervention”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 4 (KCNA)—The imperialists are applying two yardsticks, not one called international justice, interpreting and handling issues raised in international relations in their favour, and even trying to force their will upon others, says NODONG SINMUN in a by-lined article today, adding this is aimed at gratifying their dominationist ambition by interfering in other's internal affairs.

Citing the United States' attitude on the DPRK's “nuclear problem” as a typical instance of the application of double standard, the article says:

The United States is persistently kicking up a row over fictitious “nuclear suspicion” against the DPRK as if it were an “international nuclear inspector”.

If it intended to act according to one standard, it must admit and apologize for its moves of nuclear threat and not defend the nuclear program and development of nuclear weapons in South Korea, Japan, Israel and South Africa.

It is a product of the double standard employed by the United States that the International Atomic Energy Agency was compelled to “adopt” an unreasonable “resolution on special inspection” coercively, doubting the DPRK's honesty with regard to the nuclear problem only after its six rounds of inspection, although it had failed to “find” any evidence of nuclear weapons manufactured by South Africa through as many as 115 rounds of nuclear inspection of it.

The United States which has delivered offensive weapons of mass destruction and war equipment to its “allies” to cause international disputes is rather charging the DPRK with “proliferation of attack missiles”, only fully revealing how unreasonable and shameless its double standard is. Should the double standard continue to be applied in the international arena, the article stresses, justice will be interpreted as injustice and vice versa, and then the principle of impartiality will cease to exist in international relations.

South Korean, Japanese Press on DPRK Nuclear Weapons Program

IAEA To Resume Inspections

SK3004004993 Seoul YONHAP in English 0030 GMT
30 Apr 93

[Text] Berlin, April 29 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is expected to soon partially resume its ad hoc inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities after a lapse of three months.

IAEA sources said Thursday that North Korea had expressed its intention to allow IAEA experts to visit Pyongyang following active consultations between the IAEA and North Korea through letters and personal contacts recently.

The two sides were currently discussing the date of the visit, the problem of obtaining North Korean visas and other matters, they said. The visit may take place as early as early next week, they added.

Hans Meyer, the IAEA spokesman, said the date for the visit had not been set but he indicated a visit by an IAEA team was imminent by saying the IAEA officials had not yet received visas from North Korea.

The North Korean embassy in Vienna also confirmed that the two sides were negotiating on the list of visitors. They will be able to visit North Korea in a few days, it said.

IAEA sources said North Korea has shown difficulties with any IAEA visit before May 1, because it is North Korea's labor day and an important holiday.

Meanwhile, the specific purpose of the planned visit was not known but informed sources said the IAEA team's activities would likely be limited to checking functions of "the cameras and other inspection equipment" installed in the North Korean nuclear facilities and changing films.

One IAEA expert said the IAEA has to check inspection cameras and other equipment every 3 months.

The IAEA spokesman denied as inaccurate press reports that North Korea has formally asked the IAEA to observe the changing of nuclear fuel at a 5 megawatt reactor in Yongbyon, North of Pyongyang.

North Korea is reportedly planning to send a delegation to the IAEA for talks on formal resumption of ad hoc inspections of its nuclear facilities.

But IAEA officials explained that even if ad hoc inspections formally resume, it does not mean the North Korean nuclear issue found a decisive turning point for a resolution.

The IAEA spokesman also said there had not been any progress in the IAEA's efforts to hold special inspections on two nuclear facilities suspected of being nuclear reprocessing plants. North Korea has been refusing to allow special inspections of the two facilities, claiming they are just military installations.

An official at the North Korean embassy acknowledged that the IAEA was continuing to ask for special inspections on these facilities, but said that North Korea "will never allow them."

New Intermediate-Range Missiles To Be Deployed

OW3004233093 Tokyo KYODO in English 2246 GMT
30 Apr 93

[Text] Tokyo, May 1 KYODO—North Korea is expected to deploy this year new intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are capable of striking western Japan, the YOMIURI SHIMBUN reported Saturday.

The daily newspaper quoted Japanese Defense Agency sources as saying North Korea is suspected of conducting development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear-capable Nodong-1 missile would pose a "major threat" to Japan.

In a meeting Monday in Washington, the defense ministers of Japan and the United States, Toshio Nakayama and Les Aspin, are expected to discuss North Korea's missile development, the YOMIURI said.

Nodong-1, with a range of 1,000 kilometers, is based on the Soviet-designed Scud missile which Iraq used in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

The new missile may be capable of carrying biochemical warheads, the YOMIURI said.

Delegation To Attend NPT Meeting 10 May

SK0205131993 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network
in Korean 1200 GMT 2 May 93

[Text] North Korea, which has not attended any of the nuclear-related meetings since it declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], abruptly informed the United Nations that it will attend the NPT preparatory meeting scheduled to begin 10 May.

At the end of April North Korea informed the United Nations that it will send a delegation led by Pak Kil-yon, ambassador to the United Nations, to the NPT preparatory meeting in New York.

Informing the United Nations of its intention to attend the meeting, North Korea did not express a clear intention to return to the NPT. However, this recent decision represents a change from its previous position and is interpreted as an indirect expression of its intent to return to the NPT.

The meeting scheduled for 10 May is a full-fledged working meeting of the NPT member states to form a preparatory committee to discuss the revision of the NPT that is expected in 1995. North Korea, which declared its withdrawal from the treaty, was not expected to attend the meeting. Our government interprets North Korea's decision to attend the meeting as a positive change in attitude and thinks that this could lead to North Korea's declaration to return to the NPT. The government, therefore, began to formulate appropriate measures today, such as dispatching a high-ranking official to the United States.

The government has also begun to formulate measures to inform the NPT member states of the need for the countries concerned to prevent North Korea from making the meeting its propaganda site to strengthen its position, stressing that North Korea should receive special inspections as well.

IAEA Team to North Korea
SK0305233393 Seoul YONHAP in English 2331 GMT
3 May 93

[Text] Berlin, May 3 (YONHAP)—An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team left Vienna for North Korea on Sunday to conduct an ad hoc inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities, an IAEA source said Tuesday.

The five-man team will stay in North Korea for 10 days from Tuesday, changing films in cameras and checking other surveillance and sealing equipment, the source said.

The IAEA inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities had been suspended for 3 months since it was last conducted in late January.

Meanwhile, North Korea was reported to be planning to send a delegation to Vienna soon to discuss problems related to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Minister Denies Nodong Missiles Aimed at Japan
OW0305111193 Tokyo KYODO in English 1047 GMT
3 May 93

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, May 3 KYODO—North Korean Information Minister Kim Gi-ryong [name as received] said Monday [3 MAY] Pyongyang does not intend to use its new nuclear-capable, medium-range Nodong missile against Japan or other neighboring countries.

He also dismissed as propaganda a recent news report, quoting Japanese Defense Agency sources, that the missiles pose a threat because they have a range of 1,000 kilometers, capable of hitting western Japan. "This report is put out by Japan so that it can have an excuse to build nuclear bombs for defense," he said, adding this suspicion was reinforced by Japan's plan to import large amounts of reprocessed plutonium from western countries. "Japan is very advanced, so if it wants to make a nuclear bomb, it can. It's very dangerous especially with the plutonium," said Kim who is on a visit to Malaysia. He also said the missile report is a ploy to put more pressure on North Korea, which is widely suspected of having a nuclear weapons program despite Pyongyang's denial.

A Japanese daily, the YOMIURI SHIMBUN, reported Saturday [1 May] that North Korea is expected to complete development of the Nodong missile, based on the Soviet-designed Scud missile used in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, this year. The missile will be able to carry nuclear warheads as well as chemical and biological weapons, the daily said.

Conditions for Rejoining NPT Named

OW0305105993 Tokyo KYODO in English 1022 GMT
3 May 93

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, May 3 KYODO—A North Korean Government official Monday [3 May] named four conditions that must be met if it is to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT].

Information Minister Kim Gi-ryong, [name as received] on a visit to Malaysia, said Pyongyang wants a neutral International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and assurances that its military sites will remain closed to foreign checks.

The minister also said his country wants the United States to guarantee it will not use nuclear force against North Korea and that the U.S. withdraw any nuclear weapons and facilities it may have in South Korea.

"If these conditions are met, we may rejoin the treaty," he told reporters, adding North Korea has no wish or potential to make nuclear weapons.

North Korea announced it was leaving the pact in mid-March to avoid IAEA inspection of two nuclear sites in Yongbyon suspected of being used to produce nuclear weapons.

Kim also said North Korea will meet the U.S. for talks aimed at defusing tension caused by its pullout, provided the U.S. also meets these conditions and stops bullying small nations to do its bidding.

The U.S. was reported last week to be interested in opening high-level talks with North Korea to negotiate on Pyongyang's withdrawal and resolving the crisis.

North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty strengthened international suspicions that despite Pyongyang's denials, it has a nuclear weapons program. The pullout takes effect from June 12.

Kim said North Korea will allow IAEA inspection of a nuclear power plant in Yongbyon but not at a nearby military base which is exempt from such checks under the treaty.

"We can't allow the military facilities to be opened up to the IAEA, the U.S. or anyone else because it's a matter of our sovereignty," he said.

Kim also accused the iaea of being a tool of the U.S., instead of remaining neutral, because it acted against Pyongyang based on satellite photographs and information given by the U.S.

"The U.S. must change its stand of trying to use its might to force countries, especially third world nations like us, to do what it wants," he said.

The U.S., he added, should stop using "double standards" in insisting North Korea open its nuclear facilities while ignoring those of Israel and South Africa, both widely believed capable of making nuclear bombs, he said.

UN Security Council Considering Resolution
SK0405002793 Seoul YONHAP in English 0016 GMT
4 May 93

[Text] Washington, May 3 (YONHAP)—The United Nations Security Council is expected to adopt a resolution Friday urging North Korea to reverse its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

China, one of the five permanent members and the last remaining major ally of North Korea, has agreed to the contents of a draft resolution, sources said.

The five permanent security council members held a discussion April 30 on a revised version of a resolution drafted by the United States April 23, according to diplomatic sources here and in the United Nations.

China, which had been opposing any discussion of the North Korean nuclear problem at the U.N. Security Council, had agreed on the revised resolution, the sources said.

As a result, the security council will adopt the first resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue on Friday after further consultations among permanent and non-permanent members of the council, the sources said.

The resolution calls for proper additional measures to be taken against North Korea if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes a violation by North Korea of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The resolution also urges North Korea to stay in the NPT and recommends mutual and simultaneous inspections between South and North Korea and consultations between the IAEA and North Korea.

In another development, China has urged the United States to hold an early high-level contact with North Korea. But the United States was reported to hold to its position that North Korea has to express its intention to stay in the NPT prior to a U.S.-North Korean contact, sources said.

IAEA Reportedly To Only Check Monitoring Equipment

SK0505132793 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network in Korean 1215 GMT 5 May 93

[Report by correspondent Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] is planning to send a three-member team to North Korea on 8 May in order to resume the ad hoc inspection [imsi sachal] which has been suspended since last February due to North Korea's refusal to grant visas to the inspection team.

It was learned that during the negotiations with North Korea, the IAEA proposed sending a five-member inspection team according to past practices. However, the North Korean side, unlike in the past, strongly demanded the reduction of the size of the inspection team. Because of this, the two sides reportedly reached a stumbling block in negotiations.

The current inspection team will not be able to conduct free inspection activities after going to Yongbyon, North Korea,

but merely will engage in replacing the electric power source and film installed in the existing monitoring equipment. Thus, the forthcoming inspection can hardly be termed as a normal inspection.

The issue of inspecting the replacement of plutonium fuel rods in the 5-megawatt experimental atomic reactor in Yongbyon is the pending problem between the IAEA and North Korea at present. However, the two sides did not discuss this pending issue during the recent negotiations.

Meanwhile, diplomatic sources in Vienna observed that North Korea's current issuance of visas to the inspection team is a diplomatic strategy designed for propaganda purposes in the face of the adoption of a resolution by the UN Security Council.

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul Seeks Stronger Inspection Regime at NPT Meeting

SK0305063693 Seoul YONHAP in English 0612 GMT
3 May 93

[Text] Seoul, May 3 (YONHAP)—South Korea will urge the 154 other members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to strengthen the treaty's inspection regime to more effectively discover and guard against covert nuclear development when they meet to discuss its extension next week, the Foreign Ministry said Monday.

The NPT preparatory committee (Prepcom) meets in New York on May 10-14 to negotiate the future of the treaty, which expires in 1995.

Although the Prepcom meetings are intended to decide on administrative affairs such as selection of a chairman, voting procedure and budget, they regularly leave room in the agenda for "other related matters," Ministry officials said.

NPT members may decide to table North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty, they said.

North Korea became the first country in the NPT's 23-year history to try to leave the pact when it announced its departure March 12. The withdrawal becomes final June 12, after the 3-month mandatory waiting period.

NPT signatories meet every 5 years to renew the treaty. The meeting in 1995 will have to decide to extend the NPT indefinitely, for an additional fixed period, or to renew it every set period.

Seoul has not yet decided which method to opt for, but it will choose the best way to strengthen the loose authority of the NPT and give the treaty more inspection powers, officials said.

North Korea, despite its announced departure, has said U.N. mission chief Pak Kil-yon will lead its delegation to the meeting.

IRAN**Iranian Official in Bonn Makes Surprising Comments****Calls For Nuclear-Free Zone in Middle East**

*LD2904101193 Hamburg DPA in German 0923 GMT
29 Apr 93*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Iranian Deputy Speaker Hasan Ruhani has proposed in Bonn the creation of a zone free of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the Middle East. In a statement published in Bonn today on the occasion of the visit by an Iranian parliamentary delegation, Ruhani also underlined Tehran's desire for a far-reaching demilitarization of the region.

He rejected accusations of a new program of military build-up, saying that Iran is open to all possible inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and was the first Middle Eastern country to sign the convention banning chemical weapons.

At only 1.6 percent of the gross national product, Iran's military expenditures are the lowest in the region, he said.

Denies Iranian Interest in BW, CW

*LD2804224893 Hamburg DPA in German 1413 GMT
28 Apr 93*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel today met the influential Iranian Deputy Speaker, Hasan Ruhani, who is in Bonn at the head of a Majles delegation for talks on strengthening cooperation. Earlier, during a meeting with Bundestag deputies, Ruhani, who is also a member of the Supreme National Security Council, stressed Iran's desire to expand economic cooperation through an extension of political and cultural relations. [passage omitted]

[Hamburg DPA in German at 1538 GMT on 28 April reports that "Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said today during his meeting with Ruhani that the expansion of relations desired by Teheran first required the clarification of several points. This included, the Foreign Ministry announced after the talk, the human rights issue, the Rushdie case, and the end to the uncertainties regarding the situation of the German engineer Szimkus. Kinkel praised, in principle, Tehran's efforts for a 'future-oriented shaping' of relations with Germany, according to this information.

"Ruhani stressed that Iran did not have the ' slightest intention' of producing or procuring nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Neither did Iran have any problems about submitting its nuclear program unreservedly to foreign control."]

Iran To Make Concession, Says German Official

LD2704133693 Hamburg DPA in German 1246 GMT

27 Apr 93

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Iran evidently plans to make considerable concessions concerning the checking of nuclear and chemical installations in order to counter accusations by the United States and other western countries that

Tehran is involved in a large-scale ABC weapons program. This was stated by Hans Sterken (Christian Democratic Union), chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, today after talks with an Iranian parliamentary delegation in Bonn.

"The willingness of the Iranians to submit themselves to all checks far exceeds my expectations," Sterken told DPA. "I have never heard this stated so clearly before." After the meeting, Sterken also stressed that he has no doubts that the German engineer Helmut Szimkus (58), sentenced to death in Tehran for spying for Iraq, can expect a reversal of the verdict. [passage omitted]

Parliamentarian Discusses Arms Control with Kohl in Bonn

*LD3004164893 Tehran IRNA in English 1603 GMT
30 Apr 93*

[Text] Bonn, April 30, IRNA—A senior Iranian parliamentarian and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl underlined further expansion of bilateral ties here Thursday.

Majles Vice-Speaker and Head of the Foreign Relations Committee Hojjat ol-Eslam Hasan Rowhani underscored the need for a serious campaign against atomic, chemical and biological warfare and announced Iran's readiness to cooperate with Germany, as well as other European countries, in this regard.

He also said that Iran was ready to cooperate with Germany in campaign against regional and international terrorism.

Chancellor Kohl welcomed Iran's proposals for the struggle against weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and for mutual parliamentary coordination over human rights issue.

Rowhani also met with head of the Christian Parties Faction at German Parliament in which meeting the German official lauded Iran's cooperation with international circles in charge of weapons of mass destruction. The issue of human rights was also discussed.

On regional issues and the present critical situation in Iraq, Rowhani said Iran opposed Iraq's disintegration since it would cause further tension in the region. He said the only solution for Iraq's problems was employment of democracy.

In another meeting, Rowhani exchanged views with head of the intelligence and security organizations in Germany and discussed with him international and Middle East issues, efforts for nuclear disarmament and international terrorism.

The German official said his country would not allow any terrorist group to mar Tehran-Bonn relations.

Rowhani also met and conferred with head of the German Parliament Defence Committee in which he stressed that arms race in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region would be dangerous for the regional peace, stability and security.

Situation in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq and Northern Africa were also among other topics discussed in the meeting.

Rowhani arrived here on an official 5-day visit at the invitation of the German Parliament's Foreign Committee.

ISRAEL

Antiballistic Missile Warning System Canceled Due to Budget Cuts

TA3004155993 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
30 Apr 93 pp A1, 10

[Report by security affairs correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Text] The Defense Ministry has canceled the development of a simple and effective early warning system against ballistic missiles because of cuts in the development budget of the "Homa" plan, the national antimissile defense system.

The early warning system is based on detecting surface-to-surface missiles at long range with sensors. Groups of industries competed for the development project. A feasibility study conducted for the management of the Homa plan showed that the system would be highly accurate and would cost between \$20 and \$30 million, a fifth of the price of an early warning ground radar.

After the completion of the feasibility study, the Homa management decided to issue a tender among the military industries for the development of the system. But before the contract could be issued the budget was cut and the project was canceled.

Budgetary problems also led to a freeze in the procurement of an antimissile early warning radar. The Homa plan management which prepared specifications of the radar needed to defend Israel, continues to study the project and has called on several manufacturers for information on the radar and its possible cost.

Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister and defense minister, decided several months ago to cut the Homa plan budgets. Previous Defense Minister Moshe Arens gave high priority to defense against surface-to-surface missiles, but Rabin decided that the issue has lower priority.

The national antimissile defense system will under the plan, include four elements: Arrow antimissile missile batteries, radars for fire control, an early warning system against attacking missiles, and command and control systems. In selecting projects to be cut back on, it was decided to clip the command and control components and to continue the development of the Arrow and the Arrow's fire control radar.

Most of the funding for the development of the Arrow comes from the United States. Defense Ministry Director General David 'Ivri has convinced Rabin that harming the radar's development could be viewed in the United States as an Israeli pullout from the Arrow project. Rabin called on the U.S. Congress to free \$54.4 million already approved for the radar, which has been frozen due to Pentagon opposition.

Rabin approved the development budget of the Homa plan within the framework of the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] multiyear plan. The defense establishment believes that in 1996 it will be possible to supply an initial, experimental defense system with limited operational capability. According to this evaluation, the cost of such a system will be about \$1 billion, which includes U.S. funding for the Arrow since 1998.

With the absence of an independent early warning system, Israel will continue to depend on U.S. early warning satellites, as was the case during the Gulf war. The United States made a commitment after the war to provide Israel with an early warning each time there is a threat. The early warning system was used prior to the American bombings in Iraq late last year.

There is a dispute in the defense establishment over whether Israel can depend only on a foreign early warning system or should develop an independent capability. Several months ago Israel was promised that it would be incorporated in the Global Positioning System (GPS) initiated by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin. The initiative promised to provide early warning from superpower satellites to all participating countries. In the meantime, however, it appears that Bill Clinton's administration has frozen the initiative and its future is unclear.

GENERAL**Rumors of Russian 'Geotectonic' Weapons**

MK0505120493 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 19, 5-11 May 93 (Signed to Press 4 May) p 9

[Andrey Pavlov article published in the "Rumors" rubric: "Tectonic Weapons Do Exist. Mother Nature Uses Them Successfully. As for Her Sons, the Question Is More Difficult"]

[Text] Five Georgian geophysicists have appealed via SVO-BODNAYA GRUZYA to the governments of Georgia, Russia, the countries of the Black Sea Rim, and international organizations with a proposal to conduct an international expert examination of the Russian seismic laboratory in Eshery. The Georgian scientists believe that this lab may well be conducting work to develop geotectonic weapons. If this is so, damage to the laboratory as a result of yet another bombardment is fraught with an ecological catastrophe in which the Armenian nuclear power station and the high-altitude arched dam on the Inguri river will be damaged.

Dmitriy Gagua, our own correspondent in Tbilisi, has asked Tamaz Chelidze, director of the Georgian Geophysics Institute and one of the authors of the appeal, to explain. According to the scientist, he himself does not believe in the possibility of geotectonic weapons existing today, but he is worried by the atmosphere of mystery around the Eshery laboratory. Chelidze is also unhappy over the fact that a scientifically valuable facility located on Georgia's territory is controlled by the Russian side. He opposes, however, the laboratory's being ceded to Georgia because according to him, in this event the facility "will perish owing to a shortage of funds." The only way out, according to Chelidze, is joint use of the laboratory by Russia and Georgia on an equal basis.

Still, what is behind this—far from the first—wave of rumors about geotectonic weapons? A thoroughly classified reality, or something like "red mercury?" Here is what Professor Aleksey Nikolayev had to say. Nikolayev, for several years in charge of a number of seismic projects commissioned by the USSR Defense Ministry, is now a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Earth Physics.

[Nikolayev] Rumors about geotectonic weapons allegedly being tested in Eshery are utter nonsense. This facility is a regular station that belongs to the seismic service of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and is designed to monitor foreign nuclear testing sites, primarily the U.S. site in Nevada, the Chinese site in Labnor, and the French one in Mururoa. No tectonic weapons—I can say this with almost full confidence—are being developed in this country. Although it is quite possible that in its time this problem was discussed at the level of analytical memorandums. In the mid-70's the USSR signed an international convention banning research in the area of geophysical weapons: tectonic, climatic weapons, and so forth.

[Pavlov] Then there was something that had to be banned?

[Nikolayev] It was a ban for future use. Remember a firm in the United States that once sold plots on the Moon for use in the future? And they were bought, all right.

[Pavlov] Still, are there any real preconditions for the creation of geotectonic weapons? In particular, have any tests with targeted explosions been conducted here?

[Nikolayev] Yes, they have. Generally speaking, if several charges are exploded simultaneously on a large area, the waves can be phased into a targeted beam. But even so, the divergence of the cluster of seismic waves will be 20 to 30 degrees. Naturally this means a great loss of power. And please bear in mind that it is not we alone who are monitoring other countries' underground explosions. Figuratively speaking, it is impossible to sneeze here without seismic receivers, let us say, in Turkey beginning to draw graph lines. Therefore it is absolutely unrealistic to conduct actual tests of so-called tectonic weapons without the entire world learning about it. Moreover, it is not enough simply to shake a particular area for an earthquake to occur there. Favorable conditions must first be ensured, with thousands of factors coming together. Even if you know for sure—and this in itself is impossible—that in a month an earthquake will occur in a certain place and explode your nuclear charge, at best you will bring that quake forward by a week. And this is all! It is not worth the effort. [Nikolayev ends]

Neither does Colonel Vladimir Kovalenko, deputy chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's seismic service, know anything about geotectonic weapons. Moreover, the Eshery laboratory, according to him, began scaling down its activity as far back as last October. As for the "regime of top secrecy," the laboratory is a military unit, and the same laws operate on its territory as in other military units, Colonel Kovalenko says. The entire uproar, in his opinion, has been raised solely due to force of circumstances, the laboratory now being on the frontline dividing Georgian and Abkhaz units.

'No Significant Changes' in Russian Missile Forces

PM0505121393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 May 93 p 7

[Sergey Ovsyienko article: "Where Missiles Are Pointed"]

[Text] A new category of troops—the Strategic Rocket Forces [SRF]—was formed amid tremendous secrecy in the USSR late in 1959. From then on our press regularly carried TASS reports about areas of the Pacific Ocean closed to aircraft and shipping. Immediately followed by another piece of information: The targets assigned during the launching of ICBMs were reached...

The world was able to judge the potential capabilities of the new category of the USSR Armed Forces after a Soviet citizen was launched into space. Yuriy Gagarin was put into space by the first three-stage ICBM, the R-7, known to the world as the "Vostok" rocket.

The SRF were the means that enabled the USSR to ascend to the rank of a superpower. Serving in the SRF was a source of prestige and profit—the whole country showed concern

for the troops, and with rare exceptions all sectors of industry worked to meet their requirements. But all this was done under a cloak of state secrecy that could only be guessed at.

We had something to hide—the SRF gave a mighty fillip to the development of many hitherto unknown technologies and industrial and scientific sectors. In addition, the SRF was also a lever in international policy, which the USSR's leaders sometimes made with shoe in hand...

I saw a stand in the SRF museum devoted to the "Anadyr" plan. Under it there were plans in the early sixties to deploy to Cuba a division of 12,500 men and 80 R-14 single-stage intermediate-range strategic missiles. This plan was destined to be only half-implemented: It proved possible to site three regiments and 37 live missiles on the island.

The SRF now occupy a special place in a policy whose interests have, admittedly, partially shifted away from the international arena to the CIS. But more about that later.

The veil of secrecy hiding the USSR Armed Forces' holy of holies from the world has played a cruel joke on the SRF 30 years later. According to Lieutenant General Ilya Panin, head of the SRF Cadre Training and Placement Directorate, the current intake to colleges does not satisfy the High Command.

There are several reasons for this: Here too there has been a general decline in interest in military service along with the considerable cuts in the Russian Army envisaged by military reform... If you take into consideration the strategic forces' specific problems, this turning point with cadres was brought about by the signing of the START II Treaty, whereby each of our ICBMs is left with one nuclear warhead instead of 10. The SRF command now has to explain an obvious point: A missile requires the same amount of maintenance work as before.

The quest for a solution to the cadre problem, particularly among junior officers, forced the command of the SRF to take a different view of the principle of manpower acquisition. They came to rest on the opinion that being an officer is not a lifelong profession. After graduating from college, an officer may be discharged after 5 years of service. He would not upbraid the command over this, saying that it was backing down. I consider this a sober view of things: Love cannot be forced. We would remind you that a similar (3-year) approach has long been taken in "civvy street" to a young specialist. And that's OK.

The High Command now takes a different view of the troops' excessive secrecy. The necessary secrecy must be preserved, while unnecessary secrecy must be done away with—otherwise in the current conditions the cadre famine will be a major concern within the troops.

The SRF have their own network of educational establishments. The unique—in terms of the quality of its instruction—Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy was founded in 1820 by Grand Prince Mikhail. At one time, I was told by the academy's head, Colonel General Yuriy Plotnikov, it gave rise to five other military academies and six civilian higher educational establishments and faculties.

Any department has its technological field, its scientific school... Some 64 doctors of science and 530 candidates of science teach in the academy's seven faculties. And here is another detail that speaks for itself: The academy discovered the secret of Damascus steel...

The consequences of the breakup of the former USSR's Armed Forces affected the rocket forces least of all. The troops' main strategic potential was located on Russian territory. This was how the rest was broken down: Some 130 SS-19 (RS-18s) and 46 SS-24 (RS-22s) missiles were transferred to Ukraine, 104 SS-18s (RS-20s) to Kazakhstan, and 54 SS-25s (RS-12Ms) to Belarus.

The emergence of another three countries with nuclear weapons caused concern in the world. For instance, Ukraine has "taken possession" of nuclear weapons superior to the potential of China, Britain, and France put together. A great deal of the tension was relieved by the Lisbon protocol (May 1992) whereby Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pledged to eliminate strategic offensive arms over the next seven years. Immediately after Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan ratified the START I treaty, Ukraine's position, however, has begun to waver noticeably. Some political circles in the republic have begun to favor nuclear power status with increasing certainty.

According to Lieutenant General Vladimir Nikitin, deputy commander in chief of the SRF High Command, rocket forces groupings have transferred to the administrative control of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, while the High Command retains operational control. As for the "black-box" attache case, the Ukrainian president has the right to refuse the "go-ahead" for an ICBM launch. That is the compromise which has led to a dramatic situation in the republic. The crux of this being that the rocket forces groupings transferring to Ukrainian jurisdiction are having tremendous difficulties in maintaining the launch silos. Gen. Nikitin described an incident that horrified eyewitnesses. Following rainfall water leaked into a silo and flooded a missile. Had there not been a short circuit in the missile systems, Ukraine would not have escaped a second Chernobyl. Thank God, the danger passed...

From its meager stocks the Russian SRF High Command has allocated materials needed to keep missiles and launch silos in a more or less normal state. But this cannot go on for long.

Evidently people in Kiev have finally realized this too. Leonid Kravchuk recently acknowledged that Ukraine does not have the requisite potential to maintain the rocket forces.

Meetings at the Russian SRF High Command have helped to clarify the stance espoused by the military themselves with regard to the START II Treaty.

"The Supreme Soviet hearings on this treaty revealed inter alia the following idea: START II constitutes unilateral disarmament for Russia," Lieutenant General Viktor Yesin, deputy head of the SRF Main Staff, said. "That idea would be valid if it were a question of the Soviet Union. But Russia cannot endure the burden of spending on the upkeep of the

strategic arms. And without the treaty the heavy missiles whose service life has expired would have to be decommissioned. In that case the United States would obtain a greater advantage and would have far more than the 3,000-3,500 warheads envisaged by the treaty.

"When considering the pluses and minuses of START II we must bear in mind the fact that capacities for producing heavy missiles have been left outside Russia (in Ukraine). Keeping the RS-20s and RS-22s in the arsenal would present us with a choice: Either we buy them from Ukraine, or we set up the appropriate production units on our own territory. Both options are unrealistic for political reasons and because of economic considerations."

I could not help but ask the following delicate question: Who is our likely adversary now? It was tactfully hinted to me that the answer should be sought from the apparatus of the supreme commander in chief. We are soldiers; we do what we are told. There have been no significant changes within the rocket forces, and the targeting area [sektor natselivaniya] is still all around us—180 degrees to the left and 180 degrees to the right.

Russian Supreme Soviet Criminalizes Weapons Proliferation

LD2904122693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1030 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] The Supreme Soviet today adopted a law on introducing additions to the Russian Federation criminal and criminal procedure codes concerning the nonproliferation of mass-destruction weapons. Commenting on the changes in the draft law that were presented by the president, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, chairman of the parliamentary committee on issues of law and order and combatting crime, stressed that the amendments being introduced are, I quote, directed toward protecting the interests of the Russian state in carrying out external economic activities with respect to the export of raw and other materials, equipment and technologies, and scientific and technological information that could be used in making weapons and military equipment, unquote. The illegal export of these products now becomes a criminal liability.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Russian Rocket Troops Chief on Nuclear Issues

Answers Various Questions From Students

LD2704205993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Apr 93

[Video report by correspondent S. Sokolova, including recording of remark by Strategic Rocket Troops Commander Igor Sergeyev in Moscow on 27 April—from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Preparations for the three bases designated for the elimination of nuclear weapons in Russia are due to be completed on 1 September 1993. This was stated by Igor Sergeyev, commander of the Strategic Rocket Troops, at today's meeting with graduates and future students of higher educational establishments of the rocket troops. And

although strategic and nuclear missiles will be cut down, according to Igor Sergeyev, the need for this type of troops and high-class specialists will not decline, but, on the contrary, it will increase.

To a question as to how the destiny of missiles in the Ukraine is being tackled, the commander noted that in connection with the Ukraine's special position difficulties may arise in solving the question of the ratification of the START II treaty, because the recent closed hearings on nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory did not yield any results.

According to the commander, the Ukraine possesses a serious scientific-technical potential in the sphere of the production of nuclear weapons. Apart from two factories producing latest-generation missiles ...

[Sergeyev, in progress] ... an entire tactical control system and an entire sighting system have been produced in the Ukraine. [video shows missiles being transported; archive film of launchings; Sergeyev talking to graduates]

Further Report

LD2704174493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1703 GMT 27 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow April 27 TASS—"Strategic missile forces remain the main guarantor of Russian stability and safety," Strategic Missile Forces' Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev told a meeting with strategic missile forces' school graduates and cadets-to-be today.

The forces' significance will grow alongside the weakening of general purpose forces, he said.

Despite the reduction of missile forces under the SALT-1 [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and START-2 [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] Treaties, the need for high-class officers will increase. The missile forces face an uneasy task to eliminate nuclear arms, in accordance with the SALT-1 and START-2. By September 1, 1993, preparations of three bases for nuclear arms dismantling must be completed.

Speaking of ratification of the START-2 Treaty, Sergeyev told correspondents difficulties may arise from the special stand of Ukraine, which has not so far ratified the SALT-1 Treaty. In his words, Ukraine had a considerable scientific and technical potential in nuclear arms production. Two out of the three Soviet plants to produce the latest generation missiles were located on its territory. Ukraine also produced all systems of combat control and missile guidance.

The ratification of the START-2 treaty is necessary as Russia, due to financial difficulties, would be unable to produce missile parts, which were previously made outside its territory, and would have to unilaterally reduce strategic offensive armaments.

Russian Officials Urge Ratification of START II
93WC0063A Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 3, Mar 93 [Signed to press 25 Feb 93]
pp 5-16

[Article by Oleg Mikhaylovich Sokolov, director of the Russian Federation MFA Department for Disarmament and Military Technology Monitoring, and Yuriy Pavlovich Klyukin, division chief in the same department: "Toward a Secure Future: A Start for the START II Treaty"]

[Text] The signing of a treaty on further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons by the presidents of Russia and the United States on 3 January in Moscow was a major international event.

In Russia, torn by the strife of a transition period, the START II Treaty (thus termed to differentiate it from START I, signed along with the United States in the summer of 1991) immediately became the focus of a political battle. Voluminous and often contradictory assessments and commentaries have been devoted to it by politicians, journalists and experts. Heated debates over the treaty are quite natural in and of themselves—what is at stake is a document, the military, economic, social and, finally, the moral and political significance of which is tremendous and affects the interest of every citizen of Russia.

It is important that the objective of this political wrangling be a desire to genuinely and comprehensively delve into the significance of this unprecedented diplomatic act for the sake of the overall interests of democratic Russia. Unfortunately, many of the shots that have been fired at START II by critics appear to be motivated by completely different considerations.

Some criticize the treaty because it allegedly strips Russia of its last attribute as a "superpower." Others point out the "unequal" nature of obligations under the treaty and regard it as a virtual "betrayal" of our security interests. Still others claim that the treaty is fraught with economic burdens we cannot bear and the prospect of our country being drained once again, this time in the field of disarmament. And there are others who lambast the government for its "haste" in concluding this agreement. Other critical comments have also been levelled at certain specific passages in the treaty.

Clearly in order to get the whole picture and have a more balanced view of such an important event as this treaty, one should at least in passing note the reaction of the world community to its signing. An overwhelming majority of political, social, scientific, military and religious circles and the mass media in the leading countries of the world, including not only Western countries, have resoundingly hailed this new Russian-American accord.

They have unambiguously proclaimed it a major breakthrough in the cause of nuclear disarmament, one which will in effect eliminate many of the accustomed constants of the nuclear age, such as the arms race and attempts to ensure security through mutual deterrence. It was widely commented that START II represents a step toward a fundamentally new world order and lays the groundwork for the

kind of military and political thinking that humankind will carry with it into the 21st Century.

U.N. Secretary General B. Boutros Ghali has emphasized that this accord "rips out the fuse" of the arms race and is a major landmark in the cause of disarmament that will serve as an important incentive for other countries to move in the direction of controlling arms and undertaking disarmament in other areas.

It is particularly important that the other nuclear powers have high regard for the treaty's contribution to strengthening measures designed to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. A special Vatican statement noted the great moral and ethical significance of the START II Treaty.

Such high regard for the START II Treaty in the world community is quite logical, because in combination with international conventions banning biological and chemical weapons it creates a series of international legal obligations, compliance with which could over time make it possible to eliminate the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction, those that are capable not only of destabilizing the international situation, but also of destroying every living thing on our planet.

Partnership as a Security Factor

An objective assessment of the treaty also presumes above all a thoughtful and unbiased view of the new Russia's role in the world and of its policy, including its military policy, which has been fundamentally changed by the realities of our country's internal and external development. We have proclaimed efforts to bring about the democratic transformation of Russia and its entry as an equal into the community of the most highly developed countries to be our foreign policy concept, free of the old ideological dogmas.

As Russian minister of foreign affairs A. V. Kozyrev has noted, the fundamental element in that concept is "affirmation of Russia's status as a normal great power. Normalcy means an effort on the part of democratic Russia to assert its status not through confrontation and military opposition (as was traditionally done by the USSR), but instead through cooperation and constructive interaction with the entire democratic international community."¹ Adoption of this concept by the leading countries in the West, in particular the United States, has made it possible to put an end to confrontation and to affirm the principle of partnership.

That principle has received the full support of our country's highest legislative body. "Russia's decisive transition to cooperation and partnership with all countries, the continuing processes of change in the international situation, and deepening integration in all areas of action by the states of the world community," states a resolution by the 8th Congress of People's Deputies on the issue of Russian Federation military policy, "are significantly reducing the level of the direct military threat."²

The principle of partnership and cooperation set forth for the first time in a declaration by the presidents of Russia and the United States at Camp David on 2 January 1992 naturally required the two states to renounce the security

model born of the "cold war" period and commence the building of qualitatively new strategic relations.

Also on the agenda was the quickest possible transition to levels and structures of strategic nuclear forces that would preclude any incentive for launching a nuclear first strike and would ensure stability in the strategic situation, reliable security and effective restraint, accompanied by sharply reduced nuclear arsenals and a corresponding reduction in expenditures. With this approach there was no longer any room for the infamous arithmetic parity of nuclear armament that required Russia to maintain nuclear forces numerically equal (or better yet—superior!) to the forces of all the nuclear powers combined.

According to Russian minister of defense P. S. Grachev, that concept of parity is now outmoded. "It could be claimed that even a country with a large number of nuclear weapons would be unlikely to risk using them—not to mention the irreparable consequences for all of humanity to which that could lead."³ Now it is quite clear that it was precisely this striving for numerical parity, imposed on our country by the military-industrial complex, that largely contributed to the current depressing state of the Russian economy.

Proceeding upon these new principles, Russia and the United States have begun—and at a fairly rapid pace—to move toward joint agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament. As a result, for the first time in postwar history it has become possible not only to place quantitative limits on the further accumulation of nuclear weapons, but also to turn back the nuclear arms race. The process of negotiations and conclusion of agreements—also for the first time—has ceased to be outpaced by the expansion of nuclear muscle, as has been the case in the past.

The most important such agreement was START II, which set forth the Framework Agreement reached by the presidents of Russia and the United States on 17 June 1992 in legally binding forms.

Prologue to a Treaty

The new level of political trust between the two states allowed Russia and the United States to unilaterally take a number of major steps toward nuclear disarmament.

The United States sharply reduced or completely eliminated programs begun under President Reagan aimed at creating the potential for a preemptive, disarming nuclear missile strike. For example, it terminated the program for further deployment of the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, which carry 10 individually-targeted warheads apiece (of the total of 200 such missiles originally planned, only 50 have been deployed, and even those will be eliminated under the terms of the START II Treaty). The United States has also stopped production of the Midgetman small ICBM, which would carry a single warhead (there had been plans to deploy 500 such missiles).

All of the Minuteman II ICBMs slated for destruction under the terms of the START I Treaty have already been withdrawn from active targeting, the warheads have been

removed from 240 of these missiles (out of a total of 450), and 76 missiles have been removed from their launch silos.

Unilateral reductions also extend to the sea-based component of U.S. strategic forces. Production of the most modern Ohio-class missile submarines has been restricted to 18 units. Production of high-accuracy warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles that were to have been deployed on board Ohio-class submarines has been halted. All 192 Poseidon S-3 SLBMs and 32 Poseidon S-4 SLBMs and their warheads have been removed from their launch tubes.

Finally, as for strategic aircraft, the United States has limited production of its newest heavy bomber, the B-2 (capable of carrying 16 nuclear warheads) to 20 aircraft instead of the 132 originally planned. Round-the-clock alert status for strategic bombers has been cancelled and their nuclear weapons put in storage.

The decision was made to limit production of improved air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) to a level of 520 units (previous plans had called for the production of more than 1,000 ALCMs).

Production of sea launched cruise missiles (SLCM) was halted and the warheads from 400 of these missiles removed and stored at onshore facilities. All tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships, attack submarines and sea-based aviation have also been withdrawn to U.S. territory.

Analogous steps have been taken by Russia as well. A total of 530 ICBMs carrying 1,154 warheads have been withdrawn from targeting and elimination of the launch silos in which those missiles were previously housed has begun. A total of 172 launch silos have already been eliminated, as well as 209 deployed and undeployed ICBMs. Also terminated were programs to develop a small ICBM, produce rail-based ICBM launchers (production has been limited to 36 units) and modernize rail launched ICBMs.

Six nuclear missile submarines with 92 SLBM launchers have been removed from service. More than 480 undeployed SLBMs have been eliminated. The number of nuclear submarines with SLBMs on patrol has been cut in half and continues to be reduced.

Production of the Tu-95MS heavy bomber has been halted, and production of the Tu-160 heavy bomber is currently being halted. Russian heavy bombers are no longer on alert status. Their nuclear weapons are stored at military warehouses. No training maneuvers involving more than 30 heavy bombers are currently being conducted, nor are any planned.

Development of a modified short-range nuclear missile to be carried by heavy bombers has been halted, and production of existing types of ALCMs is being terminated, as well as production of long-range SLCMs, and programs to develop new types of these missiles have been eliminated.

Despite all the significance of these unilateral and essentially parallel steps (concerning which the two sides inform each other on a regular basis), Russia and the United States still have excessive arsenals of strategic offensive weapons, maintenance of which clearly does not correspond to the

radically changed nature of their relations or to economic realities. Both states and their leaders had to take a bold new step toward deep reductions in strategic offensive weapons. The START II Treaty was that step.

What Does the Treaty Stipulate?

The basic parameters of this treaty are familiar to readers of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN from the text of the Framework Agreement, which has been commented on at length in this journal (see, for example, Issue No 7, 1992). One of the most important features of this new agreement is that in contrast to the START I Treaty it is bilateral in nature: it applies only to strategic offensive weapons located within the territory of Russia and the United States.

That is understandable, because by the end of the seven-year period of reductions stipulated by the START I Treaty there should be no strategic nuclear weapons left in the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The treaty also takes into consideration the fundamentally important assumption that those three CIS states will within the shortest time possible enter into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-free states.

The START II Treaty stipulates the following principle obligations for the two sides:

- reduction by 1 January 2003 of the total number of nuclear warheads on the strategic nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) to 3,000-3,500 units or a lower level, as determined by each of the parties to the treaty;
- elimination of all ICBMs with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV);
- reduction by each of the sides of the number of nuclear warheads on its SLBMs to 1,700-1,750 units;
- inclusion of all nuclear warheads with which the two sides' heavy bombers could realistically be equipped, whether they be long-range nuclear ALCMs, short-range cruise missiles or nuclear bombs.

Reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive weapons will be achieved in two stages. During the first stage, a seven-year period following enactment of the START I Treaty, each side will reduce its strategic offensive weapons so that:

- the total level of warheads remaining on each side will not exceed 3,800-4,250, with:
- the number of warheads on MIRVed ICBMs to be 1,200;

- the number of warheads on board heavy ICBMs to be 650;
- the number of warheads on SLBMs to be 2,160.

During the second stage, which will extend to 1 January 2003, all remaining measures required to achieve the indicated maximum levels of strategic nuclear weapons will be implemented.

The START II Treaty will also contain sections regulating procedure for achieving the proposed limitations. For example, each side has the right to decrease the number of warheads counted on existing types of MIRVed ballistic missiles (except for heavy ICBMs). When that operation is carried out the destruction of the ballistic missile warhead platform on which the reduction in the number of warheads was carried out is not required, nor does it have to be replaced with a new platform. The two sides have accepted a special requirement in order to preclude the possibility of restoring the previous number of warheads on an ICBM or SLBM on which the number of warheads has been reduced in this manner.

Under the treaty each side has a right to refit launch silos for heavy MIRVed ICBMs to function as silos for single-warhead missiles. Up to 90 heavy ICBM launch silos may be refitted in this manner.

Finally, provision is made for the sides' right, under conditions of strict mutual verification, to refit up to 100 heavy bombers to perform non-nuclear missions. These aircraft will no longer be counted in the total levels stipulated by the treaty.

With the exception of cases for which provision is made in the new treaty, the text of the START I Treaty will be used to implement the treaty. A bilateral commission on implementation is being established to assist with implementation of the START II Treaty.

Boundaries of Compromise

The large-scale reduction in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States stipulated by the treaty will result in significant reinforcement of strategic stability.

Reduction by each side of its total number of nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 units or an even lower level, if either side should desire to do so, represents an unprecedentedly deep reduction in the two states' strategic nuclear weapons. That reduction means that their nuclear forces will be reduced by roughly two-thirds compared to present levels (by over 20,000 units on both sides), or by twice as much in comparison to the levels they would have had under the START I Treaty.

On Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Under START I and START II (In Numbers of Warheads)

Existing Levels of Warheads According to the Memorandum to START I			Reductions Under START I	Reductions Under START II	
Type of Strategic Nuclear Weapon	USSR	USA	CIS/USA	Russia/USA	
			Over 7 Years, in 3 Stages	First Stage (7 Years)	Second Stage (by 2003)
All Strategic Nuclear Weapons	10,271	10,563	6,000 (5,000 under a unilateral USSR initiative approved by Russia)	3,800-4,250	3,000-3,500
Including:					
Ballistic Missiles	9,416	8,210	4,900	no limits	
MIRVed ICBMs	5,958	2,000	1,540, only on heavy ICBMs	1,200, including 650 on heavy ICBMs	0
SLBMs	2,804	5,760	no limits	2,160	1,700-1750
Heavy Bombers	855	2,353	no limits	no limits; calculated on the basis of actual armament; 100 heavy bombers refitted for non-nuclear missions not included in total	
	(warheads on heavy bombers to be counted provisionally according to START I rules)				

In the process the United States will have to reduce the number of its warheads (currently numbering more than 10,000) by a factor of approximately three, while Russia will have to make actual reductions in warhead numbers by a factor of two. The Americans will also reduce by a factor of three their existing number (from 5,500 to 1,700-1,750 units) the number of warheads in the sea-based component of their strategic triad. This includes a reduction to four of the number of SLBM warheads carried on board the latest-generation American Trident-2 submarines, which are capable of carrying up to eight warheads apiece.

Of course, from a legal standpoint only the upper of the two maximum total numbers of warheads established in the treaty (3,000-3,500 units), the level that may not be exceeded, is of real significance. The lower level was established as a compromise to reflect Russia's proposal to set an even lower total level (recall that in January 1992 President B. Yeltsin proposed to the United States that reductions to a level of 2,000-2,500 warheads be negotiated; at that time the Americans were only willing to go down to a level of 4,700 warheads).

Naturally this "dual" figure has nothing to do with claims that allegedly the lower threshold is being prepared for Russia, while the United States will abide by the higher limit. If either side has the desire or, more importantly, the money, it has every right to bring its number of strategic nuclear warheads up to the maximum permissible level.

Greater strategic stability will be ensured by the removal from the two sides' arsenals, destruction and termination of production of MIRVed ICBMs. (These are missile systems which first appeared in the 1970's, first on the American side and then here. They made it possible to effectively exceed quantitative limits on nuclear weapons launchers that had been established in bilateral agreements achieved prior to that time.) The appearance of missiles, each of which was capable of carrying not one but several warheads,

introduced a serious destabilizing factor into the nuclear balance between the two powers, creating the possibility of a "counterforce" (i.e. calculated to defeat a category of nuclear forces) or a "preemptive" nuclear strike.

The problem was that it would only take two or three warheads to destroy one MIRVed ICBM in its launch silo. This became the basis for a scenario in which a small number of warheads could destroy a significantly larger number of nuclear weapons on the other side's MIRVed ICBMs. The logic of this scenario led to a dangerous temptation for the two sides in times of crisis, i.e. to launch their own MIRVed ICBMs as quickly as possible in an attempt to protect them from a nuclear missile attack by the other side. Today as a result of the agreement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs this most destabilizing element has been removed from the strategic equation.

The agreement eliminating MIRVed ICBMs is also, in addition to other considerations, of great economic importance to Russia. What is at stake is the fact that the useful lifespan of our missile arsenal will expire during the next 10-15 years (in the period between 2000 and 2005), and thus these missiles must be scrapped in any event. It should also be taken into consideration that the production infrastructure for this type of missile is in Ukraine, and reestablishing our own facilities to manufacture new missiles to replace our outdated ones, under conditions of profound economic reforms at that, is clearly not something that Russia can afford.

Hence the very clear need to ensure that the United States undertakes elimination of a comparable portion of its nuclear potential. Also confirming that these figures are not built on sand is the fact that the Americans have also had plenty of problems with the economy and it would also be in their interests to lighten the military burden. Achieving

agreement on deep mutual reductions in warheads on American SLBMs and heavy bombers was made possible thanks to the new spirit of Russian-American relations.

Despite all this, as a result of implementation of the START II Treaty Russia will by no means be stripped of the foundation of its nuclear might, its land-based strategic missiles. The heavy 10-warhead SS-18 missiles that are being eliminated will be replaced with other ICBMs carrying a single warhead. Achievement of a zero level of MIRVed ICBMs in no way means that it is necessary to physically destroy the entire category of such missiles.

Reductions could also be carried out through reduction in the number of warheads on missiles (with the exception of heavy ICBMs) to a single warhead. For example, Russia could keep up to 105 such missiles in its arsenal by performing that operation with its SS-19 ICBMs (which presently carry six warheads apiece). Incidentally, that would allow us to significantly decrease our expenditures for deployment of the updated ICBM category.

Viewed in the same physical terms, another section of the START II Treaty that is exceptionally important to us is the one permitting use of up to 90 heavy missile launch silos for the deployment of single-warhead ICBMs. They will merely have to be refitted in such a way as to preclude their use to launch the SS-18 missiles previously housed there. This solution, an extremely advantageous one from Russia's point of view, was achieved with difficulty. Until the very end of the negotiations the Americans insisted on the destruction of all heavy missile launch silos.

It was only at negotiations between Russian ministers of foreign affairs and defense and the U.S. secretary of state in Geneva on the eve of the summit meeting that we succeeded in finding a solution to this issue in the context of a general compromise. (How important this concession was to the Americans is attested to by the fact that right-wing conservative circles in the U.S. Senate, to whom George Bush presented the START II Treaty for ratification on 15 January of this year, accused him of "caving in to the Russians" on the issue of SS-18 launch silos.)

Of course, not only Russia but also the United States will in the future have only land-based single-warhead ICBMs in its strategic forces. As already noted, the United States will destroy its latest ICBM, the MX missile, and 500 Minuteman III missiles will be converted into single-warhead missiles.

There will also be a deep reduction in nuclear missiles on board submarines and nuclear weapons carried by strategic aircraft, which, as is well known, comprise the backbone of America's nuclear might. The total number of nuclear weapons in the sea-based component of the U.S. strategic triad, as previously noted, will decrease by a factor of three from its current level (approximately 5,500 weapons) and by a factor of two from the level planned in accordance with the START I Treaty (from 3,500 to 1,750 weapons). The American side will have to eliminate not only outdated Poseidon missiles. There will also be a reduction by one-half in the number of warheads on the most modern sea-based missiles, the Trident II.

However, Russia will keep in active service all of its modern missile submarines in the Typhoon and Delta-4 classes. The only vessels subject to elimination are those ships and missile complexes that have already served for a fairly long time and which are too expensive to maintain. The sea-based component of the Russian triad will be preserved to the maximum degree possible, and its share in overall strategic forces potential will increase. As stated by Russian naval commander-in-chief Admiral F. Gromov, our navy will not require any additional expenditures to implement the START II Treaty: all expenses required to implement it are already budgeted for in compliance with the START I Treaty.⁴

Finally, a word about another element of the treaty: the agreement concerning a complete (and not conditional, as was the case in previous strategic arms agreements) count of nuclear weapons on board heavy bombers. This key element was agreed to at the insistence of the Russian side.

The crux of the matter is that the START I Treaty provides for a counting procedure in which American heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear cruise missiles count for 10 warheads, though in fact such an aircraft could carry up to 20 missiles of that class. Every heavy bomber equipped to carry nuclear weapons other than long-range ALCMs counted for a single nuclear weapon, though in fact it could carry 20 or even more small nuclear missiles or nuclear bombs.

As a result of this the United States, which has always had superiority in the area of strategic aircraft, could, without formally violating the START I Treaty, potentially possess, by using its heavy bombers, roughly 3,000 nuclear weapons more than the limit of 6,000 set by the treaty.

Now that opportunity no longer exists. For the first time in the history of strategic arms negotiations real numerical equality between the two sides' strategic arsenals is being established. In order to stay within the limits established by the new treaty, the United States will have to greatly reduce the number of nuclear weapons carried by its heavy bombers. For the Russian side's air-based component the effects of implementing this realistic counting principle will be minimal.

At the same time, at American initiative the treaty includes the right to refit for performance of non-nuclear missions (and vice-versa) up to 100 aircraft currently listed as heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons (except for long-range nuclear ALCMs). That proposal was motivated by recent experience (in particular the war in the Persian Gulf), where the United States repeatedly used its heavy bombers to perform "non-nuclear" functions. In order to preclude the possibility of the treaty's objectives becoming blurred, at the insistence of the Russian side the treaty specifies strict regulations governing this category of heavy bombers.

A heavy bomber that has been refitted for non-nuclear missions may only be returned to the nuclear category once, and any procedure connected with such refitting must be carried out in a timely manner and under appropriate monitoring. However, there is also this aspect: heavy

bombers refitted for non-nuclear missions for a certain period of time continue to be listed in parentheses as combat-ready nuclear forces. This is in part due to the fact that they are not counted in the total number of nuclear weapons.

Overall, the strict strategic arms limitations established for both sides by the treaty essentially deprive them of the ability—or in any event of the temptation—to deliver a “disarming” first strike. However, the strategic nuclear arsenals left to both Russia and the United States, even though sharply reduced in size, will be more than adequate for effective deterrence. We will still have more nuclear weapons than England, France and China combined. Consequently, the concept of “nuclear deterrence” will continue to be implemented in practical terms.

The group of strategic nuclear forces that will take shape in light of the START II Treaty, Russia's minister of defense has declared, will permit us to have by the year 2003 and subsequent to that time the military means to guarantee deterrence of nuclear aggression from any potential direction against Russia or its allies. The levels set by the treaty are in line with our long-range plans for strategic nuclear arms development and the actual capabilities of Russia's industry and economy.⁵ At the same time Russia and the United States will move to a level of nuclear arms that will create proper conditions for putting the process of their further reduction on a multilateral basis or, in other words, for finally including the other nuclear powers in the negotiation process.

If one compares the START II Treaty with the START I Treaty that has already been ratified by Russia and the United States, one finds that under START I the United States would have retained a war potential more than twice that of Russia's, not to mention the fact that in economic terms it would have been very difficult for us to maintain the levels of strategic nuclear arms envisioned by that document. The new agreements, by lowering and equalizing the two countries' levels of deterrent potential, are in line with our real capabilities to actually maintain those levels.

There is one other fundamental element of the treaty that should be emphasized: it stipulates that these radical reductions in strategic nuclear arms will be carried out in continued compliance by both sides with their obligations under the still-valid 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That treaty, as readers are aware, strictly limits the ability to deploy anti-missile systems intended to destroy offensive missiles, and therefore remains one of the cornerstones of strategic stability.

Also important is the fact that implementation of the START II Treaty is directly linked to performance by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine of their obligations under the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol. The new treaty will not become effective before the START I Treaty and only after Ukraine in particular ratifies the START I Treaty and also (along with Kazakhstan, which has already ratified START I) signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state.

It should be noted that the American side expressed serious concern over the fate of the 104 SS-18 missiles deployed in Kazakhstan. The United States would like to have a guarantee that those missiles will also be destroyed. In connection with this the Russian side has informed the American side about the progress of its negotiations with Kazakhstan on preparation of an agreement concerning procedure for implementation of START I and about its efforts to achieve agreement with the Republic of Kazakhstan that all heavy ICBMs and their launch enclosures currently deployed in Kazakhstan will be destroyed.

Disagreements Should Lead to the Truth

By signing the START II Treaty Russia and the United States are beginning to lay the foundations for qualitatively new relations in the strategic military realm. The amounts of reductions and limitations contained in this document naturally coincide with both countries' efforts to maintain the strategic balance at a radically lowered level that will guarantee strategic stability and ensure that development of the situation at the turn of the century is predictable. Moreover, despite the depth of the reductions Russia still retains the ability to deter any potential aggressor, while the threat of a first strike is reduced.

One often hears accusations concerning the “excessive haste” with which the START II Treaty was concluded. Supposedly it should be ratified and implemented only under the new U.S. Administration. Indeed, this treaty (including the Framework Agreement as well) was drawn up by the two sides in about one year's time. However, this was not done to the detriment of careful analysis of issues and was possible thanks to mutual political will in the two countries, their partnership relationship, and the realization by the leaders of Russia and the United States that it was essential to take decisive action to reduce the nuclear threat. In addition, from a political standpoint there was absolutely no point in artificially dragging out conclusion of a treaty that is balanced and in line with our security interests, especially since Bill Clinton, the new President of the United States, wholeheartedly supports it. As the President of Russia stressed when he signed the START II Treaty, “if our side had any doubts that he (Bill Clinton) would not stand by this document, then we would not sign it.”⁶

Finally, swift conclusion of the new treaty was facilitated by the fact that 90 percent of it is based on the text of the START I Treaty, so it was not necessary to spend years developing the treaty language.

There is also another side to this issue. Protracted efforts to embody the Framework Agreement in a full-fledged treaty under George Bush's presidency would inevitably have resulted in a certain time lag (perhaps one lasting many months)—due to the change of administration in Washington—in our overall relations with the United States. Timely signing of the treaty, on the other hand, will ensure the necessary continuity in those relations, including relations with the Clinton Administration. This is a good example of the correct use of a political moment to achieve an optimum agreement.

Naturally many people are interested in the economic and social effects of implementing the START II Treaty. Of course carrying out reductions on this scale will require substantial expenditures, particularly during the initial stage. Whereas there were plans to spend R30 billion [rubles] implementing the START I Treaty (at first quarter 1992 prices), that figure could rise by 20-30 percent due to the signing of the START II Treaty. For example, the additional expenses that will be incurred by the Strategic Missile Forces are estimated at R6-8 billion. As already noted, the Russian Navy will not incur any additional expenditures.

However, in the end the START II Treaty will bring substantial savings for both sides, since they will have to maintain substantially smaller arsenals. Whereas current expenditures to maintain Russia's Strategic Missile Forces are approximately R20 billion annually (at mid-1992 prices), after the reductions that figure will be (at comparable prices) approximately R15 billion annually.

Generally speaking, the new treaty was drafted by our diplomats with an eye for maximum savings. For instance, we save approximately R2 billion for every SS-19 missile we retain. Considerable savings—also totalling approximately R2 billion apiece (at 1992 prices)—will accrue to Russia from the opportunity to refit launch silos to house single-warhead ICBMs. Money will also be saved through simplification of the monitoring and inspection system.

For its part, the United States has pledged to render Russia any technical assistance it may require to implement the START II Treaty, as well as help developing and implementing environmentally safe programs to eliminate the weapons in question.

But naturally the "profitability" of the treaty cannot be measured in economic terms alone. The most important thing is that this agreement reinforces our country's security during a difficult period of profound domestic change, while adequately reflecting changes in the strategic situation. In this case it is indeed true that "a treaty is worth more than money."

Some people claim that the START II Treaty "imposes" on Russia a disadvantageous structure for its strategic "triad" and shifts the focus to the leg of the triad where the Americans have traditionally been strong. Indeed, subsequent to realization of this treaty the structure of Russia's and the United States' strategic nuclear forces will clearly be more similar than today. In principle there is much that is positive about that, because this eliminates some unclear points that have inevitably arisen due to differences in each side's strategic nuclear arms structure, thereby increasing the predictability of each side's actions.

Furthermore, strictly speaking the START II Treaty does not contain any requirements that obligate Russia to wholly accept the American structure for its strategic nuclear forces. True, both sides are giving up their MIRVed ICBMs. But it is also true that within the limits of overall limitations on the total number of nuclear weapons allowed, as well as limits on the number of nuclear weapons on sea-based ballistic missiles, Russia has a right to change the correlation

between the components of its "triad" across a broad range of choices. For example, the treaty clearly would permit Russia in the year 2003 to have 1,000 land-based single-warhead ICBMs instead of the 500 warheads that the United States plans to have on its ICBMs. Similarly, the treaty does not require us to have exactly the same number of nuclear warheads on sea-based missiles as the United States has.

On the whole the treaty gives both sides flexibility in their choice of their strategic nuclear arms structure, and it does not in any way infringe upon Russia's national security interests.

In its efforts to reach agreement on the START II Treaty the Russian side naturally relied on appropriate recommendations from our parliament. Specifically, a Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree issued on 4 November 1992 concerning ratification of the START I Treaty recommended that when proposals in regard to further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons were being prepared consideration should be given to the position of Supreme Soviet committees on defense, security, international affairs and foreign economic relations.

The conclusion of those committees in connection with ratification of the aforementioned treaty indicated, among other things, that the total level of warheads accepted in the Framework Agreement between the presidents of the United States and Russia on 17 June 1992 was acceptable from the standpoint of strategic stability and would permit each country to independently determine the structure of its strategic forces.

As for ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Supreme Soviet, in view of our domestic political situation that will not be easy. As noted, also of great significance will be Ukraine's ratification of the START I Treaty and entry by Ukraine and Kazakhstan into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-free states.

In this connection concern continues to be raised by Kiev's slowness in ratifying the START I Treaty. Although Ukraine has underscored its intention of becoming a nuclear-free state, it simultaneously is undertaking steps aimed at gaining control of the nuclear weapons located within its territory. High-ranking officials in Ukraine have issued statements to the effect that the strategic missiles deployed there, including the components of nuclear weapons, are Ukrainian property. The results of a recent meeting between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine that focused on the issue of nuclear-free status for the latter permit one to hope that the Ukrainian parliament will heed the unanimous appeals of the world community and ratify the aforementioned documents in the form in which they were signed.

A majority of well-reasoned statements by Russian politicians as well as serious commentaries in the mass media and by experts all give a positive assessment to the START II Treaty. That, combined with the content of the document itself, give serious grounds to believe that in the end it will be ratified and implemented.

Footnotes

1. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1992, No 7, p 5.
2. VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1992, No 51, 24 December, p 3753.
3. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 June 1992.
4. See: ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 19 January 1993.
5. See: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 January 1993.
6. IZVESTIYA, 5 January 1993.

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U.S. Senators, Russian Parliamentarians Discuss START-2

*LD0505125393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1249 GMT 5 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow May 5—The START-2 treaty has paramount meaning for Russo-American relations, according to Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. At a meeting today with members of the Russian parliament, Nunn said that this agreement will not upset the weapons balance of the two largest nuclear powers. The American senator added that the American people do not want a new arms race, like the Russian people.

Members of the Russian parliament informed the American senators that the START-2 ratification process in the Supreme Soviet is not simple and the treaty is causing many disputes. The deputies added that long and difficult work is still ahead to ratify the treaty.

U.S. To Help Fund Belarus Disarmament

*WS2904141593 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian
1113 GMT 29 Apr 93*

[Text] Speaking at the 28 April meeting with Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, U.S. envoy Goodby said: "We could reach an agreement with countries that want to buy enriched uranium from strategic nuclear missiles eliminated by the republics of the former USSR. Belarus, too, has these missiles." Mr. Goodby is the manager of the program implemented under the Nunn-Lugar Law. He is visiting Belarus with a U.S. delegation that arrived to discuss the issues of granting assistance for establishing a system of exports control.

The Nunn-Lugar Law, adopted by the U.S. Congress in December 1991, provides for a grant of about \$800 million worth of financial aid from the U.S. Department of Defense budget to the successors of the former USSR for the withdrawal and elimination of nuclear arms and their forms of transportation. In accordance with this law, the United States will grant Belarus about \$10 million worth of equipment and services in order to secure the safe withdrawal of strategic arms from its territory. However, following the

Belarusian ratification of the START-I treaty and participation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States declared its readiness to expand the framework of assistance, also with regard to issues not directly related to the withdrawal of nuclear arms. At the initiative of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, 11 projects have been drafted that anticipate foreign assistance.

Having mentioned these projects, Stanislav Shushkevich emphasized the 12th project which is now being discussed. The project stipulates [words indistinct] of the Russian officers who have expressed a desire to stay in Belarus. According to the U.S. envoy, this can be done within the "Conversion" project. He emphasized that the U.S. side had highly assessed the "consistent and highly moral" stance of Belarus in the issues of nuclear disarmament and was ready to develop cooperation in the already existing programs of export control. Shipments of the equipment will start as early as June. The next step will be launching the constant communication channel between Washington and Minsk.

U.S. Ambassador to Belarus David Swartz participated in the meeting.

Ukrainian Society Divided Over Retention of Nuclear Weapons

Popular Opinion Poll Shows Majority Against
*AU2704144393 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
23 Apr 93 p 4*

[Unattributed report: "What Do We Think About Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The problem of nuclear weapons located on Ukraine territory remains one of the most painful ones. The interest on the part of Russia and the United States in resolving it is well known.

The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Sociology Institute has conducted a sociological study to find out the citizens' opinion on this. According to the latest poll, about 31 percent of respondents favor maintaining nuclear weapons in Ukraine; 52 percent favor destroying them; and 17 percent are undecided.

If Ukraine decides to transfer the nuclear weapons to Russia, 48 percent of respondents think that Ukraine should receive compensation, 7 percent believe that there is no need for compensation, and one in four oppose the transfer of nuclear weapons to anyone. One in every five did not answer this question.

Environment Minister Kostenko on Domestic Debate

*MK2704110093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Apr 93 p 3*

[Vladimir Skachko report under "Ukraine" rubric on briefing by Ukrainian Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko "at the end of last week;" place not given: "Too Many Conflicts. Ukraine's Nonnuclear Status Still Problematical;" followed by unattributed report quoting at length from statement by 162 Ukrainian people's deputies demanding that Ukraine be declared a nuclear state]

[Text] At the end of last week the deputies working group on questions associated with Ukraine's ratification of the START II Treaty and its acquisition of nonnuclear status held closed parliamentary hearings. The group, together with specialists, experts, and all interested deputies, considered the scientific and technical aspects of nuclear disarmament. This group is headed by Ukrainian Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko, also a people's deputy, who on the same day briefed journalists on the parliamentary hearing's results. It was clear from what he said that the participants had not arrived at a united opinion and that additional hearings would be needed.

Here are some questions and Kostenko's replies to them at the briefing.

Question: [all questions by unidentified correspondents] In your group's view, is Ukraine currently a state possessing nuclear weapons?

Kostenko: This question has arisen repeatedly, and I have always quoted the wording of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It says: "A state possessing nuclear weapons is a state that has produced and exploded nuclear weapons or another nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967." It is the only definition that meets the varying norms of international law and gives a definition of who exactly is a nuclear state. Under this definition Ukraine is a nuclear state, because before 1 January 1967 it, as part of the USSR, de facto carried out a nuclear explosion. We are, furthermore, the former USSR's successor as regards all its property rights and legal obligations, and consequently we are also a nuclear state in this respect.

Question: What kind of realistic prospect does Ukraine have of providing a scientific and technical basis for maintaining nuclear weapons? How many years would it take to establish a full maintenance cycle for Ukraine's nuclear potential and how much will this cost?

Kostenko: According to the data presented, this requires a very large sum of money: over \$40 billion. But the possibility of creating such a cycle in Ukraine has not yet been considered in discussion, because we did not have all the necessary information.

Question: Was the question of building nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the upkeep of what already exists considered?

Kostenko: Several options were considered: the upkeep of existing nuclear weapons, the construction of new ones, and Ukraine's acquisition of nonnuclear status. Bearing in mind Ukraine's scientific and technical and industrial potential, it does, of course, have the potential to build its own nuclear weapons. This is what specialists claim. But that is not the problem. From where do we get the resources? How is a maintenance system to be established? In short, there are very many military, political, scientific and technical, and ethical problems.

Question: Did specialists consider a link with nuclear power engineering, for example, with respect to transforming fuel for warheads into fuel for stations? For Ukraine, what are the material consequences of destroying missile silos?

Kostenko: The question of using nuclear weapons components for nuclear power engineering is being considered. We reached the conclusion that simply transforming highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium is technically inadvisable. It would be more advisable for Ukraine, which now faces the problem of establishing its own nuclear cycle, to retain some of the highly enriched uranium, because some other types of nuclear station reactors might be found in the future. As regards the destruction of launch silos and the transportation of toxic substances from Ukrainian territory, this is a very important problem for us. Specialists have suggested that we either build our own production facilities to utilize these substances, or preserve them for the needs of peaceful space exploration in the future. At the moment both require extraordinary expenditures.

Question: Which ones specifically?

Kostenko: According to specialists' data, if only warheads are destroyed, between \$1 and \$2 billion. If silos are destroyed, as the START I Treaty requires, up to \$3 billion.

Question: Has the question of Ukraine's constructing its own nuclear testing site in Ukraine been discussed?

Kostenko: Specialists have stated that to have nuclear weapons one must also have one's own nuclear testing site: either it must be in one's own country, or a site on foreign territory must be used.

Question: What is your comment on the statement by 162 deputies demanding that Ukraine be declared a nuclear state and that the appropriate Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decision be adopted to do this?

Kostenko: My signature appears at the end of the statement. I have shared these views for a long time.

Question: Could it happen that because of the adoption of a military doctrine the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will proceed toward ratification of the START I Treaty, and are discussions of military doctrine and of nuclear disarmament problems interrelated? When might the START I Treaty be ratified?

Kostenko: These questions cannot, of course, be completely separated. Ratification of nuclear disarmament is on the agenda for parliamentary sessions but I cannot say whether ratification will take place. For example, our commission is preparing some comments on this question. It has not finalized them, and the hearings on the scientific and technical aspects of nuclear disarmament are evidence of how many problems we still have to solve and how much still has to be clarified. The commission has no general information that could be submitted to the Supreme Soviet. If the treaties are submitted for ratification without this information, the deputies' present questions will arise right in the debating chamber. They must be answered clearly. Failing that, parliament will not be able to ratify anything.

Question: In what kind of state are the Ukrainian-Russian talks on nuclear disarmament?

Kostenko: Many statements describing the progress of these talks have already been made on this subject in the press. The talks are not advancing because a fundamental question

has not been solved—that of ownership. Russia is raising it as follows in the talks: without defining its rights of ownership to Ukrainian warheads, it is refusing to maintain these warheads. But if this question is raised more broadly, it will then be necessary to solve the question of the status of Russian troops on our territory, because the warheads can be maintained only by military units belonging to Russia. If the problem is solved like this, as Russia wants, political decisions by our Supreme Soviet are needed, while our parliament, as you know, has adopted a decision that everything on Ukrainian territory is Ukrainian property. A decision on Ukraine's neutrality and nonaligned status has also been adopted.

Question: Does the commission have at its disposal data on Ukraine's possible losses should the world community impose economic sanctions against it if it does not ratify the nuclear disarmament treaties?

Kostenko: Once again I want to stress that at the moment Ukraine has not violated a single international norm or a single international treaty, and at the moment such sanctions as are being implemented by the United Nations against Serbia and Montenegro cannot be imposed against Ukraine. These sanctions can operate only after our Supreme Soviet's ratification of the said treaties and in the event that they are not implemented or legal commitments of one kind or another that it has assumed are broken.

Question: Can Ukraine prohibit the launching of missiles from its territory?

Kostenko: Specialists say that it can.

Question: How are the START I Treaty, the Lisbon Protocol, and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons interrelated? Because some Ukrainian politicians are claiming that the START I Treaty's ratification will lead to the destruction of only 36 percent of nuclear missiles in Ukraine.

Kostenko: Without ratification of the Lisbon Protocol, the START-1 Treaty will have nothing to do with Ukraine because this protocol alone legally registers Ukraine's participation in nuclear disarmament. Regarding the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which Ukraine is due to ratify as a nonnuclear state, it immediately comes into conflict with the Lisbon Protocol. Because when we ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory are not ours, and consequently the START I Treaty has nothing to do with us. That is, in other words, there are very many legal conflicts over these questions. Consequently the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet must decide in what context and in what capacity Ukraine is to ratify these documents, so that there are no conflicts and so that everything is aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons. [Kostenko ends]

The above-mentioned statement by 162 Ukrainian people's deputies on the republic's nuclear status says, in particular: "Following Ukraine's proclamation of independence and the USSR's disintegration, Ukraine, as one of the successor states to the former USSR, became a nuclear state. This is

confirmed in Article 12 of the Agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States, ratified by the parliaments of all CIS member states; by the Lisbon Protocol (Article 1), in which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States recognized Ukraine as an equal party to the SALT I Treaty; and by the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States Regarding Treaties, which was ratified by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

"Unfortunately, there are currently many conjectures and excessive emotions concerning the question of Ukraine's nuclear status and its rights of ownership over the nuclear weapons located on its territory. This manifests itself in the positions and official statements of certain states' representatives.

"In this context we believe that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet must reaffirm its right of ownership over the nuclear weapons located on its territory, by adopting the appropriate decree on this subject.

"In the absence of confirmation of Ukraine's status as the owner of the nuclear weapons located on its territory, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet cannot start definitive consideration of the START I Treaty. Owing to the Ukrainian and world public's imprecise knowledge regarding their positions, Ukraine's ratification of the treaty could be viewed as a case of Ukraine's elimination of nuclear weapons that do not belong to it.

"Certain states' attempts to force Ukraine immediately to ratify the START I Treaty, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Lisbon Protocol, and to renounce the status of a state which de facto and de jure is the owner of nuclear weapons from the viewpoint of international law, are intolerable.

"A profound analysis of the agreements mentioned is being conducted in Ukrainian Supreme Soviet commissions. It must provide an answer as to whether they are in Ukraine's national interests and the interests of national security. It is clear even now that a whole range of problems must be solved before START I is ratified. In particular, this applies to the question of compensation for the nuclear materials removed from the warheads of the tactical nuclear weapons which were transported from Ukraine to Russia in spring 1992, to the guarantee of these weapons' destruction by Russia, to the huge financial costs of reducing nuclear potential, and to other no less important problems. We are grateful to those states that are offering Ukraine certain resources to cover the costs of cutting nuclear weapons. Questions of nuclear disarmament, state independence, national security, and territorial integrity, however, cannot be the subject of bargaining or any monetary compensation.

"Ukraine is the first state in the world to have stated its intention to get rid of its nuclear weapons in the future voluntarily and on its own initiative. It immediately set about carrying out this intention, by transporting tactical nuclear weapons from its territory last year. We hope that other nuclear states will follow Ukraine's example."

The statement was signed by representatives of practically all Ukraine's political parties, movements, and groupings.

[For further information on Kostenko and his views, see the Arms Control Report of 29 April 1993, page 19.]

People's Deputies Advocate Continuation
AU3004095293 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
27 Apr 93 p 1

[“Statement by Ukraine’s People’s Deputies on Ukraine’s Nuclear Status”; place and date not given]

[Text] Following the Declaration of Ukraine’s Independence and the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine, as one of the states that are successors to the former Soviet Union, became a nuclear power. This is confirmed by Article 12 of the Agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that was ratified by the parliaments of all CIS member states, by the Lisbon Protocol (Article 1) where Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America recognized Ukraine as an equal side to the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons (START-1), and by the Vienna convention on the succession of states with regard to agreements that was ratified by Ukraine’s Supreme Council.

Unfortunately, today, there is too much speculation and unnecessary emotion surrounding the question of Ukraine’s nuclear status and its right to own the nuclear weapons that are located on its territory.

We believe, in this regard, that Ukraine’s Supreme Council must, in the very near future, confirm its right of ownership of the nuclear weapons that are located on its territory, having adopted a corresponding decree on the question.

Unless Ukraine’s status as an owner of nuclear weapons located on its territory is confirmed, Ukraine’s Supreme Council will be unable to proceed to an ultimate discussion of START-1. Due to the fact that the Ukrainian and world public is not adequately informed about Ukraine’s position, the ratification of the treaty by Ukraine might be regarded as a fact of eliminating by Ukraine nuclear weapons that do not belong to it.

Attempts on the part of some states to force Ukraine to immediately ratify START-1, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Lisbon Protocol and to give up the status of a power that is, de facto and de jure, an owner of nuclear weapons are inadmissible from the point of view of international law.

A thorough analysis of the aforementioned agreements is being conducted by Ukraine’s Supreme Council commissions. It must give an answer regarding the conformity of these agreements to Ukraine’s national interests and to the interests of international security. It is clear already now that, even prior to the ratification of START-1, a whole complex of problems needs to be resolved. This applies, in particular, to the question of compensation for the nuclear materials that were taken out of the warheads of the tactical nuclear weapons that had been transferred from Ukraine to Russia in the spring of 1992, to the guarantees for destroying these weapons by Russia, and to the enormous financial expenditure on the reduction of the nuclear potential and to other no less important problems.

We are grateful to those states that offer certain capital to Ukraine to cover its expenses on the reduction of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would be a mistake to agree to promises of insignificant monetary compensation in exchange for Ukraine’s immediate nuclear disarmament. The question of nuclear disarmament, state independence, national security, and territorial integrity cannot become an object for bargaining or “monetary compensations.”

The instability in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the armed conflicts in these regions tend to expand. Territorial claims upon Ukraine are officially stated. Many countries today work on creating their own nuclear weapons (specialists have estimated that, by the year 2000, there may be between 15 or 20 nuclear powers in the world). There is a precedent when a country that had formerly joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty officially declared its intention to withdraw from it.

Ukraine is the first country in the world that declared, at its own initiative, its intention to get rid of its nuclear weapons in the future. It immediately started to implement this intention, having withdrawn tactical nuclear weapons from its territory last year. We hoped that other nuclear states would also follow suit.

Ukraine, with its peaceful external policy and stable internal political situation, is, today, one of the guarantors of stability in Eastern Europe.

We hope that the world community will show understanding and support for our position.

Mostyskyy, Melnychuk, Holubets, Osadchuk, Pushyk, Bohdan Horyn, Kosiv, Drach, Kendzyor, Shvayka, Yukhnovskyy, Khmara, Barabash, Chornovil, Yavorivskyy, Oles Shevchenko, Mykhaylo Horyn, Yakheyeva, Shepa, Chernenko, Shkarban, Pylypchuk, Pavlychko, Yakovyshyn, Tolubko, Yemets, Karpenko.... (162 signatures altogether).

Ukraine Government Continues To Bluster on Nuclear Weapons Issue

Kravchuk Gives Speech

PM2804161993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report: “Ukrainian President’s Speech to Cossacks”]

[Text] Kiev—The details of Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk’s speech to members of the general council of senior officers [starshina], elders, and kray hetmans of the Ukrainian Cossacks have become known.

Journalists were not invited to this meeting. Only the newspaper URYADOVYY KURYER, the organ of Ukraine’s state executive, provided a detailed report of what occurred. The striking thing is that this official report devotes a considerable amount of space not to the problems of the resurgence of the Ukrainian Cossack community—the reason for the meeting between the president and the Cossacks—but a quite different issue: Whether or not Ukraine should be a nuclear power.

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The topic of nuclear weapons has been discussed for some time now at closed plenary sessions and in the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet. Parliamentarians have not yet formulated a common opinion. The Ukrainian president's position is becoming increasingly interesting, especially the tone in which it is couched. Here is a word-for-word translation from the Ukrainian of the section of L. Kravchuk's speech in which he talks about Ukraine's nuclear weapons:

We want the world to respect us not just as a great and strong power, but first and foremost as a power that pursues a considered and sensible policy. This is how we should approach the issue of whether or not Ukraine should be a nuclear power. In our declaration of independence we proclaimed the nonnuclear status of our country. And we were subsequently accepted throughout the world as a nonnuclear power.

Of course we can change direction, but we need suitable grounds for doing so. For Ukraine, which in practically every way was a part of the military imperialist complex which constituted the former USSR, such grounds do not exist. We will not be able to independently maintain [obespechivat] the nuclear weapons we possess. It is beyond our competence to establish our own closed cycle, which is mandatory for any nuclear power. The warheads stationed on our territory are controlled from Russia and fitted out by the Russian side. In order to develop [sozdat] our own nuclear warhead we would have to spend \$25 billion according to preliminary estimates. Moreover, as soon as Ukraine proclaimed its status as a nuclear state, fuel supplies for our nuclear electric power stations would be discontinued the very next day. Since we have little coal and only our neighbor has oil and gas, shutting down our nuclear electric power stations would inflict enormous damage on our entire economy and bring it almost to a standstill. This is the situation. We should understand that nobody except Russia will give us a gram of oil, and Russia basically supplies our gas as well. We are in debt to our neighbors, since we cannot settle up for everything on time. Only Russia will give us credit for fuel, although, understandably, it dictates its own terms.

So how are we to get out of the situation that has developed? By looking for exclusively political ways of resolving problems, showing flexibility, and not ruling out compromise—otherwise we will not survive.

I would like very much, L. Kravchuk noted, for the Cossack movement to take a constructive line and uphold positions which will enable us to preserve our dignity and honor.

Parliament Delays Debate on START-1 Treaty
*AU0305190693 Paris AFP in English 1848 GMT
 3 May 93*

[Text] Kiev, May 3 (AFP)—The Ukrainian parliament Monday postponed the debate on ratification of the START-1 nuclear arms reduction treaty amid growing tension in neighbouring Russia, parliament sources said here.

"The situation in Russia has influenced discussion of the document," Sergei Semenets, deputy chairman of the parliamentary commission on the START-1 treaty, told AFP. He also cited the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Communist Party as a reason for the delay.

Hardline members of Russia's parliament Monday faced possible charges of inciting violence following May Day clashes between pro-Communist supporters and riot police during which about 200 people were injured.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk Monday proposed that discussion of START-1 be postponed until the week beginning June 4, when a new constitution is due to be adopted in Russia, according to the reform timetable put forward by President Boris Yeltsin.

In the past few months the Ukrainian leadership has repeatedly expressed anxiety over the rise of Russian nationalism.

For months Ukraine has delayed ratification of START-1, signed in July 1991 by former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and his U.S. counterpart George Bush.

Ukraine is demanding financial compensation and security guarantees before it starts dismantling its nuclear weapons.

Ukrainian leaders frequently voice doubts about whether Russia is actually destroying nuclear warheads transferred to its territory in accordance with START-1.

Warhead Destruction Talks Raised to Premier Level

*AU0505134593 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
 in Ukrainian 4 May 93 p 1*

[“Statement by the Press Service of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers” in Kiev; date not given]

[Text] The Press Service of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers states that, in view of the agreement reached between the president of Ukraine and the president of the Russian Federation on raising the negotiations on problems of destroying strategic missile warheads to the level of prime ministers of the aforementioned states, Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers has invalidated the directive of 16 November 1992 on creating a governmental commission for holding negotiations with the Russian Federation on the problems of destroying strategic missile warheads.

Russian Official Says Ukraine Playing ‘Nuclear Card’

*934E0613A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
 in Russian 23 Apr 93 p 7*

[Report by Ivan Sas of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Center: “Ukraine’s ‘Nuclear Card’ Still Not Covered”]

[Text] Ukraine's aspiration to decide in its own way the fate of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR is causing the world community serious alarm. Major General Dmitriy Kharchenko, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry International Treaty Directorate, comments on some aspects of this problem:

"Let us look at the situation from the standpoint of international law. In accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol to the START I treaty signed on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon, Ukraine undertook to subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as soon as possible. As a state which does not possess these weapons, what is more.

"The Ukrainian side has also repeatedly confirmed this position subsequently, making official written and verbal statements and agreeing that all rights and obligations connected with possession of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR were reserved to the Russian Federation.

"But while saying one thing, the Ukrainian side has simultaneously taken a quite different path.

"Even in April of last year, all formations and units of the strategic forces deployed on the territory of the republic (missile and air armies) were unilaterally incorporated into the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Center for Administrative Control of Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was formed here.

"Subsequently, all nuclear-engineering units were transferred to the jurisdiction of this center. The personnel of two such units, in which over 500 nuclear weapons are deployed, took the Ukrainian oath. The subunits guarding the missile batteries and the nuclear weapons sites have come to be manned only by citizens of Ukraine. The crown of all these actions was the blunt statement at Russian-Ukrainian negotiations this March that the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of the republic are the property of Ukraine.

"The START I treaty has already been ratified by four states—the United States, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus. But the Ukrainian parliament is still debating what political and economic benefits may be derived by using the 'nuclear' card as a trump card.

"I do not want to prophesy, but I fear that the strategic offensive arms deployed on the territory of Ukraine cannot be eliminated within the time frame specified by the START I treaty. Ukraine's position is altogether putting the validation of the START I and START II treaties in jeopardy and stymieing fulfillment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."

SDI, SPACE ARMS, GLOBAL DEFENSE

Notification to Readers

[Editorial Report] An FBIS survey of media reporting on the experimental Russian 'plasma weapon' is currently available to consumers of the Arms Control Report. Entitled 'Russia: Press Plays Up Capabilities of Antimissile Plasma Weapon,' this survey provides information beyond the translations published in the Arms Control Report of 21 April, pages 10-14. To order a copy of this article, call the Arms Control Report editor on (703) 733-6454.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Belarus Proceeding With CFE Requirements

MIG Fighter Planes Scrapped

*LD0305161393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1553 GMT 3 May 93*

[By BELINFORM correspondent Leonid Tratsevsky for TASS]

[Text] Minsk May 3 TASS—A nine-strong group of French military inspectors arrived in Minsk to witness and document the scrapping of the first batch of ten combat planes MIG-27 at the Lesnaya airbase near the city of Baranovichi.

Belarus is eliminating these planes in accordance with the European conventional arms treaty.

Major-General Viktor Vakar, head of the Belarusian National Control and Inspection Agency, told BELINFORM that the treaty-stipulated expensive procedure of eliminating the planes and other military equipment inherited by the republic from the former Soviet Armed Forces is a burden Belarusian tax-payers have to bear. Nonetheless, the republic is fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other authorities are now looking for new approaches to the fulfillment of the conventional arms treaty to lessen the burden.

French Team Arrives To Monitor Destruction

*WS0405081993 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 0300 GMT 4 May 93*

[Text] A NATO military inspection team composed of French airmen has arrived in Belarus to monitor the destruction of high-tech MiG-27 fighter planes under the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. These are the same aircraft whose acrobatic maneuvers evoked the admiration of the French during recent airshows at Le Bourges near Paris. The French team, nine men strong, arrived at the Minsk-2 airport via a direct route from Paris. The Inspection Act determines the exact date of the destruction of the first 10 warplanes. The document, signed by Gorbachev, is strictly observed by Belarus.

Russian Airborne Troops Leave Ukraine

PM2904114793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Video report by Sergey Fateyev and Boris Zamchinskiy, identified by caption]

[Text] [video opens with announcer backed by inset of trains] [Announcer] The withdrawal of the 98th Belgorod Airborne Division from Ukraine to Russian territory began today.

[Fateyev] One train after another is leaving the Bessarabian steppes in southern Ukraine today, bearing away one of the most illustrious divisions, a "first wave" ["pervyy podyem"] division, as they are known—these are airborne troops. After Ukraine adopted a course of taking the troops

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and arms on its territory under national control 18 months ago, the overwhelming majority of the personnel in the Belgorod Division refused to take the oath to the Ukrainian people. Initially its opposition was no less fierce than that of the Black Sea Fleet. It needed the maximum restraint and the ability and will to listen to one another in order to arrive at the only correct solution in this situation, namely to share out the division in a fraternal way.

[begin interview] What will Ukraine be getting?

[V.N. Stepanov, deputy commander of Odessa Military District, identified by caption] It will get the bulk of the equipment and arms. The fixed-term NCO's and men are Ukrainian citizens; they are serving here and will remain here.

[V.A. Sorokin, deputy commander of the Russian Airborne Division, identified by caption] I think that we will continue to maintain our links.

[Fateyev] A good example of how the most serious and most acute military problems in relations between Russia and Ukraine can be resolved. [video shows trains carrying freight under cover, tank loading operations, interviews]

Ukrainian Disarmament Committee Discusses CFE Limits

LD2904204593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] The second sitting of the National Committee of Ukraine for Disarmament [Natsionalny Komitet Ukrayiny z Pytan Rozzbroyennya] was held in Kiev today. Ukraine's adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe were discussed. Particular attention was paid to the so-called flank limits [flanhovi limity] of the treaty, whereby a limit is set with regard to the defense potential of our state in the southern sector.

The committee participants were unanimous about the need for Ukraine to most speedily join a special communications system set up by the CSCE participating states to contact each other on an operational level, first and foremost on the introduction of relevant agreements in the sphere of consolidating trust, security, arms control, and disarmament. Ukraine has everything required to join this system most speedily in the opinion of specialists. The decision was made to start relevant negotiations.

This was reported by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry press center.

Latvia: All Russian Aircraft Removed From Baltics

LD2704213493 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 27 Apr 93

[Text] Air Force Lieutenant General Vasiliy Proskurin, commander of the air force of the Baltic Fleet, has told a Baltic News Service correspondent that all Russian aircraft have been removed from the Baltic states, from Suurkula in Estonia, and Tukums and Skulte in Latvia. The general stated that in the past 2 years the conditions for basing aircraft in the Baltic countries have become very complex.

Thus the Russians will plan air force activity in other ways in the event of a [words indistinct] threat.

Lithuania: Russian Military Withdrawal Continues

Russian Military Cantonment Handed Over

LD2704174993 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 27 Apr 93

[Summary from poor reception] The handing over of a military cantonment started today in Kalvarija, Marijampole rayon. The artillery regiment of the 7th Russian airborne division was deployed there. It is expected that this operation will last for several days, as the reception commission has to accept 48 various buildings, including barracks garages, sport halls, and others.

Russian Military Experts Coordinating Withdrawal

WS2904080293 Tallinn BNS in English 1759 GMT 28 Apr 93

[Text] Vilnius, Apr 28, BNS—A group of military experts from the Russian Ministry of Defense started working to coordinate troop withdrawal from Lithuania in Vilnius Tuesday.

The Russian experts met with Colonel Stasys Knezys, government commissioner for Russian army withdrawal and head of the Lithuanian army headquarters.

The meeting was devoted to technical questions of the continuing pull out, the social and political situation of Russian officers in Lithuania and preparations for the Russian defense minister's visit to Lithuania, scheduled for mid-May.

The withdrawal will not be delayed for any political reasons, the experts said. In an interview with Lithuanian TV they noted that the units deployed in Lithuania have many "organizational" problems - the equipment is dismantled, depots and registration of military property are disorganized.

A majority of Russian units lack enough soldiers for loading and other work. The experts said Lithuania should offer help to solve these problems.

Lithuania allowed Russia to bring in an additional 300 Russian soldiers in April to assist the withdrawal.

The experts said they are prepared to speed up the solution of all problems and, if necessary, to remain in Lithuania until the pull out is completed.

Knezys told Lithuanian TV that the military experts of both countries will also focus on problems of handing over military installations, primarily military enterprises and airports.

The Russian group meets with Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius Wednesday.

WEAPONS CONVERSION

U.S. Firm, Minatom To Design New Plutonium-Fueled Reactor

934E0551A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Apr 93 p 6

[Article by Sergey Leskov, IZVESTIYA, Chicago: "America and Russia Are Beginning Their Work on Making Weapon-Grade Plutonium Harmless"]

[Text] The American company General Atomic and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy have reached an agreement on developing and building a new type of nuclear reactor which will be capable of processing plutonium that is now in atomic bombs and converting it into electricity.

It has been proposed that the nuclear reactor, costing 1.5 billion dollars, be constructed in Russia where there are gigantic reserves of weapon-grade plutonium removed from disarmed atomic bombs. In contrast to the relatively easy processing of weapon-grade uranium, the problem with weapon-grade plutonium has not yet been resolved and greatly concerns the West, because the atomic fuel now stored in depositories may in time fall into unreliable hands.

General Atomic is the first American company in the field of atomic energy that, several years ago, began cooperating with the USSR. Last year the US federal government concluded over 100 contracts through this company with Russian specialists for research on atomic energy.

The reactor belongs to a new and very promising generation of energy sources, and may be designed and built over the next 10 years. Instead of water, traditionally used to rotate the power turbines, warmed up helium will be used. According to experts, the proposed design will allow half the plutonium heat—obtained during burning—to be processed into electrical energy, which is significantly more than the 33 percent maximum coefficient of useful work reached by today's nuclear power stations. The reactor will burn up to 95 percent of the nuclear fuel, but its size will be much smaller than any of the types of nuclear power stations now in operation.

N. Blue, director of General Atomic, emphasized that the physical characteristics of the new reactor ensure its increased reliability, and in principle specifically exclude the possibility of a meltdown of the active zone, which is the greatest danger in case of accidents. All this has prompted experts to predict that after the first reactor has been built in Russia, new nuclear power stations will be built all over the world.

At the same time, some specialists are reacting with caution toward the agreement between the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and General Atomic. In 1992 the Bush administration also made plans for joint work on using enriched uranium in civilian industries, but this agreement vanished without a trace in the course of bureaucratic coordination. P. Lowenthal, president of the Washington Institute for Controlling Atomic Energy, believes that the use of plutonium for commercial purposes is in and of itself undesirable and that it is better to bury it in special crypts.

Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Bound for U.S.

LD0205223793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 2130 GMT 2 May 93

[Text] Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Professor Viktor Mikhaylov flies to the United States on Monday for the purpose of implementing the Vancouver accords of Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton. It was announced at the Ministry's information directorate that during the visit talks are planned with the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Mr. Brown, Secretary of Energy Ms O'Leary, and Assistant to the Secretary of State Ms Davis. The subject of the discussions at the talks will be an anti-dumping agreement to harmonize Russia's interests regarding quotas and sale prices of natural uranium on the American market, and a contract for the sale of enriched uranium fuel obtained from dismantled nuclear ammunition.

INTER-REPUBLIC ISSUES

Russia and Latvia Wrangle Over Troop Withdrawal

Latest Talks Suspended

LD270422193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1451 GMT 26 Apr 93

[From the "Panorama" program]

[Excerpts] In connection with the fact that the latest 3-day round of Latvian-Russian talks was due to start in Riga today, our correspondent in Latvia, Inars Skujins, met two influential Latvian politicians, Dainis Ivans and Janis Jurkans. [passage omitted]

The round of talks that was due to start today has not taken place, even though reports that it had begun were made by various agencies, including Mayak.

We contacted the head of the Russian state delegation to the talks with the Latvian Government delegation, special envoy Sergey Zотов, and he made the following statement:

[Begin Zотов recording] Mayak listeners doubtless already know that the Supreme Council of the Latvian Republic intends to adopt a resolution on 28 April, which will in effect lay down a legal basis for subsequent deportations of tens of thousands of ethnic Russians [rossiyane]. The Russians doubtless also know of the position adopted by the president of the Russian Federation in this connection.

The Russian state delegation to the talks made its own statement on Saturday, stressing that the draft resolution adopted by the Latvian parliament as a basis grossly violates the commonly recognized international norms in the area of human rights, and also the obligations undertaken by Latvia when it joined the UN and CSCE.

In case this decision is adopted, it will put back talks on the withdrawal of Russian troops from this country, which are already difficult. In fact, all the positive work done by the state delegations of the two countries over the past year on creating a contractual and legal basis for the purpose of settling issues relating to the social protection of the troops

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

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being withdrawn and also of military pensioners and members of their families permanently residing in Latvia—civilians working in military units are included in the same category—will be nullified. I want to stress that it was the absence of such agreements that was one of the reasons which prompted the president of the Russian Federation to suspend the withdrawal of troops from Latvia.

It is obvious that the latest anti-Russian action will have a negative effect on bilateral economic ties and will make it impossible for Russia to grant Latvia the most-favored-nation status in trade.

The decision that is being prepared by the Latvian parliament has an illegal, inhuman and, I would say, provocative nature, as it is being made against a background of major efforts on the part of Russia to withdraw Russian troops from Latvia, whose numbers have been reduced in the past year from 57,000 to 22,000. Incidentally, Mayak listeners have become the first people to learn this figure—it is being made public for the first time.

Under these conditions, the Russian side does not see any sense in holding a regular round of Russian-Latvian talks planned for 26-28 April this year, which is dependent on certain actions of the Latvian Supreme Council. This issue relating to setting a new date for a meeting between the state delegations of the two countries will be tackled after the possible consequences of the adoption of this decision are elucidated. [end recording]

DIENA on Yeltsin's Attempt To 'Influence' Policy
WS2704135693 Riga LETA in English 1055 GMT
27 Apr 93

[Text] Riga, April 27 (LETA)—The daily "Diena" commented upon the reaction of Latvian officials to the statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The Latvian Foreign Ministry in its official statement expressed the incomprehension of Yeltsin's attempt to influence the pace of the adoption of the resolution by making premature judgments about a document that was put under discussion of a foreign parliament as a project. Latvian Foreign Ministry said that the consideration of the issue at the Latvian Supreme Council was called forth by the failure of Latvian-Russian talks to reach an agreement about those militaries and their family members who should have to leave Latvia during the army withdrawal. Latvia had always been ready to solve these problems by way of bilateral talks, "just a similar willingness from Russia was needed." Yeltsin in his statement said that a considerable part of the population was being robbed of the rights to legal residence and Latvian citizenship. But Latvian Foreign Ministry explained that there were no grounds for either presence of Russian troops on Latvian territory or Soviet officers and relatives to demand Latvian citizenship.

Yeltsin's Hasty Statement Delays Pullout
MK2804094493 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
No. 11, 27 Apr 93 (Signed to Press 26 Apr) p 4

[Dmitriy Zhdannikov commentary: "The Seym Was Prepared To Wait, Yeltsin Preferred To Make Haste"]

[Text] The Latvian Seym has put off, until 27 April, the passing of a decree "On Temporary Residence Permits for Persons Whose Presence Is Connected With Temporary Deployment in the Latvian Republic of the Armed Forces of Russia." The deputies after all left some room for dialogue with Russia on matters of citizenship, having decided to adjust their stance depending on the results of yet another round of Russian-Latvian interstate negotiations.

However, the opposition expressed by Boris Yeltsin last Friday to all of the drafts proposed to the Seym, on the grounds that every one of them "will create a legal basis for ethnic cleansing," may lead to a situation similar to that which followed the previous round when, in the wake of Pavel Grachev's statement "On Halting the Withdrawal of Russian Troops From the Baltic Countries," the state delegations failed in the final analysis to agree on a single key political and military question.

The drafts submitted for discussion by the Seym on Wednesday cause concern, to put it mildly, among the Russian-speaking population of Latvia. The People's Front faction draft that proposes to class as "temporary residents" some 75,000 people, including all military men on active duty, and some veterans [sentence as published]. The more radical draft by the Satversme affects those who came to Latvia following demobilization from the armed services of the ex-USSR, and civilians of the former Soviet defense enterprises, and all relatives of these persons, totaling 250,000 people, or 18 percent of the republic's population.

Yeltsin's indignant statement must also have been influenced by an about-face made by Latvia's Foreign Ministry, which has always been remarkable for the law-abiding and well-disposed nature of its pronouncements. The latest statements by Georgis Andreyevs, head of Latvia's foreign policy agency, far from having smoothed over the differences, have taken the conflict to a national level. "Any widening of the circle of Latvia's citizenry will destroy the main ethnic group of residents," Andreyevs declared. He disproved the "ridiculous claim that 50 percent of Latvia's population is not going to take part in elections," and optimistically corrected the figure to 25 percent (a number that exceeds even the one appearing in the ultra-radical draft of the Satversme.)

The Russian president was too hasty with his statement, and missed the possible positive results of the Russian-Latvian talks (it was these results, rather than the president's statement, that the Seym had been waiting for). No one else managed so well to smooth over previous statements by Grachev, Yeltsin, and Andreyevs, as did the Russian and Latvian diplomats. The impression in this case is that President Yeltsin simply wanted to drum up more support before the referendum among the military.

Negotiator Says Latvia Playing for Time
MK2804133093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 3

[Dmitriy Borisov report published in "Russia-Latvia" column: "Russian-Latvian Interstate Negotiations Postponed Indefinitely, Says Sergey Zotov, Head of Russian Delegation at Talks With Latvia"]

[Text] The reason for this decision, according to S. Zotov, was the statement by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, and also the Russian delegation's concern over the discussion in the Latvian Supreme Council of a "resolution laying down a legal foundation for subsequent deportation of tens of thousands of ethnic Russians," scheduled for 28 April.

This document, in the opinion of the chief Russian negotiator, hinders what are already difficult negotiations between the interstate delegations over Russian troop withdrawals from Latvia. He stressed that the decisions pending in the Latvian parliament are of an inhumane nature. At the same time S. Zotov noted that one gets the impression that Latvia actually needs a permanent presence of Russian troops on its territory as an excuse for various provocative actions.

Sergey Zotov for the first time disclosed the number of Russian troops remaining on Latvia's territory. It has fallen from 57,000 last year to 22,000. He also pointed out that Boris Yeltsin's statement to the effect that "foundations for ethnic cleansing are being created in Latvia" is not simply an appeal to the Russian media but an instruction for Russia's chief representatives in the CSCE and the United Nations to meet with the leaders of these organizations and urge them to use their authority in resolving the problems of ethnic Russians. The head of the Russian delegation expressed his deep conviction that "such inhuman actions by the Latvian government and parliament would have been impossible without the tacit consent of the West."

"Russia is coming through a period when it is finally becoming clear who are the friends and who are the enemies of democratic transformations in Russia," Sergey Zotov said. "Support for President Yeltsin's reforms is often hypocritical, and meanwhile many Western countries are trying to destabilize the situation in Russia via the Baltic countries." According to S. Zotov, Latvia and Estonia themselves do not understand the shortsightedness of their policy, adopting a position of political revanchism and attempting to take revenge against Russians. Against the backdrop of tremendous efforts by the Russian delegation, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, and Defense Ministry, one is often aware of "little pinpricks" and unlawful actions on the part of the Latvian authorities. A good case in point is the failure to observe the noncommercial settlements accords whereby some \$25 million transferred by the Defense Ministry to the Latvian Central Bank could not be used to pay allowances to Russian servicemen because Russia's money was tied up in various technical credits.

Sergey Zotov described as a ploy the Latvian parliament's decision to postpone the consideration of a law on the temporary presence of Russian military servicemen on Latvia's territory until the first round of negotiations produced some results, while he called Boris Yeltsin's statement quite timely. "The treaty on the legal protection of Russian servicemen was presented to the Latvian side more than 6 months ago but the Latvians never got around to considering it," S. Zotov stressed.

Lithuania's Landsbergis Urges Review of Pacts To Be Signed With Russia

WS0405102493 Tallinn BNS in English 0805 GMT
4 May 93

[Text] Vilnius, May 03, BNS—Rightist opposition leader Vytautas Landsbergis turned up his heat on signing blind documents at a proposed Lithuanian-Russian summit.

Although little has been determined about the summit, Landsbergis insists that President Algirdas Brazauskas should not be able to sign any without a government review.

Brazauskas last week was issued the invitation to Moscow, but neither country has formally coordinated a date or a purpose for the visit. Lithuanian officials suggest the two parties may conclude an agreement on the Russian army withdrawal, which they failed to sign Sept. 8.

"Russia is trying to press on various new conditions," charged Landsbergis. "I have grounds to be concerned about the documents that President Brazauskas may sign. Moreover, even the delegation for negotiations does not know about them."

The opposition leader reminded journalists at a press conference Monday that during his visit to Moscow as the parliament chairman last September, President Yeltsin showed documents with his personal notes, even though the agreements had been coordinated by both sides in advance. Landsbergis said it is not yet clear who did one's best to ruin the documents and added that these must have been "Russia's backstairs affairs."

Lithuania later received new draft agreements with new demands, which were unacceptable to Lithuania, he said. Landsbergis mentioned a demand to recognize the property of the Russian army. Other suggestions have now cropped up like giving "a legal status with exceptional rights" to the Russian community in Lithuania.

Landsbergis said it is not clear what kinds of agreements are prepared now and wanted to know exactly what Brazauskas intends to sign in Moscow.

NETHERLANDS

Russian Military Monitors Destruction of Weapons
*LD0105202993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1156 GMT 1 May 93*

[By Itar-Tass correspondent Taras Lariokhin]

[Excerpts] Soesterberg (Netherlands), 1 May (TASS)—A group of Russian military inspectors visited a testing ground near the town of Soesterberg in central Holland today and were acquainted with the process of the destruction of the Dutch combat equipment which is being eliminated in

accordance with the treaty on conventional arms in Europe [CFE Treaty]. Forty armored carriers made by the Dutch company DAF and turned into scrap were presented for inspection. [passage omitted; other details of Dutch combat equipment to be destroyed or disposed of in accordance with the treaty] We are satisfied with the results of the inspection. This was revealed in a conversation with an ITAR-TASS correspondent by the head of the Russian delegation, Colonel Aleksandr Krupin. The Dutch side is meticulously fulfilling all the procedures written in the treaty on conventional arms in Europe. We have no observations or complaints, he underlined.

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